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The Modern Case for Withholding
Kathleen DeLaney Thomas*
Who is responsible for paying taxes to the government? Currently, the
answer depends on one’s employment status. Employees enjoy the luxury of
not having to think about tax remittance during the year because their
employers withhold taxes from their paychecks. Non-employees, on the
other hand, face a much more onerous system. They must keep track of and
budget for taxes during the year, make quarterly remittances to the IRS, and
may face penalties for failing to do so. Although this regime has been in
place for many decades, there are several reasons why reform may be in
order.
First, the independent contractor workforce is expanding, propelled in
large part by the growth of the gig economy. This means an increasing
number of taxpayers are earning income outside of employment that is not
captured by withholding. Second, the rise of the internet and other advances
in technology have made withholding by third parties more efficient and
less costly than was historically the case. Finally, advances in the social
sciences have shed new light on why many taxpayers appear to prefer
withholding and why it may serve to enhance overall welfare.
Accordingly, this Article proposes an expanded withholding regime that
would condition withholding on the size of the business making the
payments, rather than on the business’s status as an employer. Under such
a regime, any business earning over a certain threshold that pays more than
a de minimis number of workers would be required to withhold taxes. To
address cases where withholding would not be feasible, this Article also
introduces the concept of “quasi-withholding.” Quasi-withholding would
interject a private third party between the taxpayer and the IRS to facilitate
* Copyright © 2019 Kathleen DeLaney Thomas. George R. Ward Term Professor
of Law, UNC School of Law. I am grateful to Luke de Leon and Melissa Hyland for
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tax payments and replicate the benefits associated with withholding. The
third party could be a financial institution or a private business formed
specifically to assist with tax remittance. Expanding withholding would
vastly simplify the tax system for taxpayers, while enhancing revenue
collection for the government, presenting a rare “win-win” opportunity for
tax reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you buy a house in a new town and need to purchase
electricity from the local utility company. Further imagine that the
utility company gives you two options for payment. The first is that you
can monitor and read your own electricity meter, calculate your bill
with a formula provided by the utility, and mail the utility company a
check of roughly $300 once every three months. (Failure to mail the
check on time or miscalculation of the amount due may result in a late
payment penalty.) The second option is that the utility company will
calculate your usage for you, send you a bill each month for roughly
$100, and allow you the option to have the monthly payment directly
debited from your bank account.
For a number of reasons, most people strongly prefer the second
option. First, research shows that people generally like paying their
debts sooner rather than later, and they prefer paying in multiple,
smaller increments as opposed to larger lump sums.1 Paying monthly
bills via direct debit also likely makes payment less painful for
consumers, either because they pay less attention to the payment or
because the automatic and recurring nature of the payment makes it
easier for them to mentally budget for the loss.2 Finally, the second
option clearly involves less effort, as the consumer can avoid the time
and hassle of figuring out her costs and mailing a check.
The tax system similarly divides taxpayers into two systems of
payment, although not at the taxpayer’s option. Employees are offered
something like option two, that is, a simple direct debit system of paying
taxes. More specifically, employers withhold taxes from their
employees’ paychecks and remit the tax to the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) on the employee’s behalf. The employee then files a year-end
return reconciling the amount withheld with the total tax due and, in
most cases, claims a refund for the difference.
Those who earn income outside of employment, such as business
owners, gig economy workers, and other freelancers, are essentially
1
2

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.

84

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:81

forced to contend with option one. These taxpayers must budget for
taxes during the year, calculate estimated taxes, and submit quarterly
payments to the IRS. Unsurprisingly, the group subject to withholding
pays taxes in a more accurate and timely manner than the group not
subject to withholding. Indeed, income tax withholding has proven to
be one of the government’s most powerful and effective enforcement
mechanisms to ensure compliance with the tax law.3
Despite the enormous success of withholding as a tax collection
mechanism, lawmakers have not expanded its use since it was broadly
instituted in the first half of the twentieth century.4 Yet there are several
reasons why such expansion may be in order in the present age. First,
the independent contractor workforce is expanding, propelled in large
part by the growth of the gig economy.5 This means an increasing
number of taxpayers are earning income outside of employment that is
not captured by withholding. Second, the rise of the internet and other
advances in technology have made withholding by third parties more
efficient and less costly than was historically the case.6 Third, advances
in the social sciences have shed new light on why many taxpayers
appear to prefer withholding and why it may serve to enhance overall
welfare.7
Tax withholding has received little attention in legal literature.8 Yet
withholding touches upon fundamental questions about how the tax
system should be administered. Namely, who should be responsible for
remitting taxes to the government, and who should bear the costs of
remittance? With these questions in mind, this Article explores the
normative arguments for and against withholding. It contends that
many of the arguments previously advanced against the use of
withholding no longer hold in the modern era.
One common argument against expanding withholding is that it is
costly and unfairly burdens the third parties who must assume the cost.9
3 See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, American Economic Development, Managerial
Corporate Capitalism, and the Institutional Foundations of the Modern Income Tax, 73 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 55-56 (2010).
4 See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (describing enactment of current
withholding regime during World War II).
5 See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415,
1420, 1430-31 (2018).
6 See infra Part II.
7 See infra Part III.
8 Two notable exceptions are Richard L. Doernberg, The Case Against Withholding,
61 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1982) and Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and
Optimal Tax Liability, 63 TAX L. REV. 797 (2010).
9 See infra Part I.C.
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However, advances in technology over the past several decades have
greatly altered the cost-benefit calculus of withholding. In particular,
the availability of payroll software enables payers to withhold taxes on
payments to workers at relatively low cost.10 Large businesses likely
already use such software to compensate non-employee workers. The
small marginal costs incurred by large payers to add withholding to
their payroll functions will often be far lower than the aggregate cost of
imposing tax remittance obligations on each individual worker.
Another critique of withholding is that it cedes too much power to
the government, while unfairly depriving taxpayers of the use of their
funds before taxes are due.11 While these arguments are not without
merit, critics of withholding have generally failed to take into account
what research in the social sciences teaches us about taxpayer
preferences. Specifically, there is ample evidence that taxpayers actively
prefer withholding and also prefer overpaying their taxes so that they
can claim a refund at the end of the year.12 Although some
commentators have argued that such preferences are irrational from an
economic point of view, when factoring in psychological costs,
preferences for withholding and overpayment may be perfectly
rational.13 And since the government also benefits when taxes are paid
early and accurately, withholding may present a unique “win-win”
scenario in which the interests of taxpayers and the government align.
After reexamining the traditional arguments against withholding, this
Article next offers guidelines for evaluating when withholding is
warranted. For example, withholding is most likely to be beneficial if a
single payer transacts with multiple payees in a business setting,
particularly if the payer is larger and more sophisticated than the
payees. On the other hand, withholding obligations are likely inefficient
if imposed on individuals making payments in a personal capacity (a
homeowner paying a housepainter, for example).
The Article then offers concrete suggestions for ways policymakers
should expand withholding, including a proposal for basing
withholding on the size of the payer’s business. Under current law, the
obligation to withhold is based entirely on whether the payment is made
to an employee.14 This system encourages misclassification of workers
and excludes independent contractors from the benefits of

10
11
12
13
14

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (2018).
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withholding.15 A better system, which would expand the number of
taxpayers able to take advantage of withholding, is to base withholding
requirements on the profile of the payer, regardless of the payer’s
relationship with the payee. Such a payer-based withholding regime
would require withholding on any business-related payment as long as
the payer: (1) has business receipts over a certain threshold (say
$100,000) and (2) compensates more than a minimal number of
workers (say at least 10). For large payers (e.g., a platform company like
Uber), no determination of employee versus independent contractor
status would be necessary.
Withholding by payers is not feasible in all cases, however. Consider,
for example, a housepainter who paints 100 houses in a year at a cost of
$500 per job. It would be inefficient to require each individual
homeowner to withhold taxes for the painter. Acknowledging this fact,
this Article also introduces the concept of “quasi-withholding” and
advocates for its use. Quasi-withholding would interject a private third
party — other than the payer — between the taxpayer and the IRS to
facilitate tax payments and replicate the benefits associated with
withholding. The third party could be a financial institution or a private
business formed specifically to assist with tax remittance. For example,
a housepainter might open a special business account with a bank where
she would deposit income from her business. The bank, in turn, would
deduct a set percentage of every deposit made by the taxpayer for taxes
and make quarterly remittances on the taxpayer’s behalf.
The unifying theme among these proposals is that third-party
remittance is often preferable to an individual remitting her own taxes,
from both the taxpayer’s perspective and the government’s. And because
third-party remittance inevitably imposes costs on those third parties,
this Article also suggests ways the government can and should subsidize
that cost. In many cases, directly subsidizing third-party withholding or
quasi-withholding would still result in a net gain for the government
given the tax collection advantages.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers background on the
U.S. withholding system and surveys past arguments for and against
withholding to provide historical context for the arguments made
herein. Part II reexamines the economic costs and benefits of
withholding in light of advances in technology and the changing nature
of the economy in the digital age. Part III then overviews research in the
social sciences that suggests why taxpayers may have preferences for
15 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., EMPLOYERS DO NOT ALWAYS
FOLLOW INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WORKER DETERMINATION RULINGS 1-2 (June 14,
2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201330058fr.pdf.
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withholding as opposed to direct remittance. Part IV discusses policy
implications and argues for expanded withholding rules. Specifically,
Part IV proposes basing withholding obligations on the size of the
payer’s business, rather than on the employment relationship. Although
some have advocated for expanding withholding to particular sources
of income,16 this Article is the first to suggest basing withholding purely
on the economic profile of the payer, which is simpler and more
efficient. Finally, Part IV also proposes that quasi-withholding be
implemented when withholding is not feasible and discusses its
implementation.
I.

BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING
A. History and Overview of Tax Remittance Rules

The idea of taxing income “at the source,” that is, collecting income
taxes from the payer rather than the payee, traces back to early
nineteenth century England.17 After the first British income tax,
introduced in 1799, was widely considered a failure, it was replaced
with a regime in 1803 that collected tax on certain forms of income from
the payer.18 This time around, the tax exceeded revenue expectations
and was widely hailed as a success.19
Today, most developed economies collect at least some income tax at
the source through withholding,20 and the United States is no exception.
Although withholding was first introduced in a limited form during the
Civil War,21 its broad application in the United States came about in
16 See, e.g., Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-222,
§ 511, 98 Stat. 941 (2005) (3 percent withholding on government payments to
independent contractors, passed and later repealed); Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (proposal for withholding
on certain investment income); New Economy Works to Guarantee Independence and
Growth Act (NEW GIG Act of 2017), S. 1549, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (proposing
5 percent withholding for gig economy workers).
17 See PIROSKA E. SOOS, THE ORIGINS OF TAXATION AT SOURCE IN ENGLAND 1-4 (1997)
(observing that although the first income tax collected at the source originated in
England in 1803, historians have identified land taxes collected at the source as early as
the seventeenth century). See id. at 4-5.
18 See id. at 2.
19 See id. (“This tax was a success, and at 5% it yielded almost as much as the income
tax of 1799 at 10%.”).
20 Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Government? The
Economics of Tax Remittance, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 251, 263 (2008).
21 Id. at 262; see also Doernberg, supra note 8, at 599. For a discussion of the early
history of withholding in the United States, see Ajay K. Mehrotra, ‘From Contested
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1943, when policymakers were faced with dire revenue needs to fund
World War II.22 It is during this time that the U.S. federal income tax
truly became a “mass tax,” one that applied to the general population,
and not just to businesses and the highest earners.23 To implement such
a broad scale tax for the first time and ensure that wartime revenue
needs were met, Congress enacted a system whereby employers would
withhold taxes on the wage income of their employees.24 As is the case
today, the 1943 bill did not require withholding for other forms of
income such as dividends, interest, or independent contractor
receipts.25 At the time of its enactment, wage withholding enjoyed broad
popular support, with most surveyed individuals viewing tax payments
as patriotic support of the government during World War II.26
1.

Current Rules for Employment Income

Today, the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) continues to require
employers to withhold income taxes on employees’ wages and remit the
withheld tax to the IRS. 27 The Code also imposes payroll taxes on
wages, which are split between employers and employees, each of
whom pay 7.65 percent (for a combined rate of 15.3 percent).28
Employers directly remit their half of the payroll tax obligation and they

Concept to Cornerstone of Administrative Practice’: Social Learning and the Early History
of U.S. Tax Withholding, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 144, 151-62 (2016); Charlotte Twight,
Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of Institutional Change, 14
CATO J. 359, 367-69 (1995).
22 See Slemrod, supra note 20, at 263; see also Doernberg, supra note 8, at 601-02.
23 LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE RETURNBASED MASS INCOME TAX 71 (2013) (“In 1939 . . . only one American in twenty was an
income taxpayer or the dependent of an income taxpayer. By the end of the war nearly
three-quarters of the population was covered by the income tax.”); see also Twight,
supra note 21, at 370.
24 See Doernberg, supra note 8, at 601-02.
25 Id. at 601.
26 See id. at 602.
27 See I.R.C. § 3402 (2018).
28 See § 3101(a) and (b) (employee tax comprised of 6.2 percent for Social Security
plus 1.45 percent for Medicare); § 3111(a) and (b) (same components imposed on
employer). Additional Medicare taxes (0.9 percent) apply for employees paid more than
$200,000 per year, and Social Security taxes are not required after a certain wage ceiling,
which is $132,900 for 2019. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB.
NO. 15, (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 23-24 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p15.pdf [hereinafter I.R.S. PUBLICATION 15]. The employer may also have to pay
federal unemployment taxes on the first $7,000 of wages at a rate that varies based on
the amount of state unemployment contributions made. See id. at 36.
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also withhold the employee’s portion of the payroll tax obligation.29
Employees receive “credit” for paying withheld taxes regardless of
whether the employer remits them to the government, while employers
are fully liable to the IRS for taxes that they are required to withhold.30
Employers are also subject to harsh penalties for failing to withhold
taxes.31
When starting new employment, an employee is required to fill out a
Form W-4 to indicate her withholding preferences.32 The employer then
uses this information and an IRS withholding table to calculate the
amount to be withheld from each paycheck.33 Application of the
withholding tables results in most employees being slightly
overwithheld, with the result being that most employees claim a refund
at the end of the year when they file their tax return.34
Once they have a W-4 on file with their employer, employees have
the option to revisit the form and adjust their withholding periodically
but are not required to do so. Thus, an employee who has worked for
multiple years for one employer can essentially pay taxes on “autopilot”
if she chooses, waiting until the end of the year to pay any additional
balance or (in most cases) claim a refund on her tax return.
2.

Current Rules for Non-Employment Income

Non-employee workers — such as independent contractors or noncorporate business owners — are not subject to withholding on their
earnings.35 Instead, these workers generally must make estimated tax
payments four times per year36 in addition to paying any tax owed with
their year-end return. Failure to make quarterly estimated tax payments
29

See § 3102.
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.31-1 (2019) (credit to employee); I.R.C. § 3403 (employer
liability for tax).
31 Employers are deemed to hold withheld funds “in trust for the United States,”
and may be subject to a penalty of 100 percent of the tax for failing to withhold, along
with other potential penalties. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6672, 7501(a). For a discussion of this
and other penalties related to withholding, see Doernberg, supra note 8, at 617-22.
32 Instructions to Form W-4 indicate that taxpayers may claim various personal
allowances based on marital status, the child tax credit, and credits for other
dependents. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FORM W-4 2 (2019),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw4.pdf. However, taxpayers are not required to do so.
See id.
33 See I.R.S. PUBLICATION 15, supra note 28, at 46.
34 Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach to
Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 142 (2013).
35 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
36 I.R.C. § 6654(c)(2) (2018).
30
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can result in the imposition of a tax penalty when the taxpayer files his
return.37 Non-employee workers must also pay self-employment taxes
on their net earnings at a rate of 15.3 percent,38 due quarterly.
Other sources of non-wage income, such as rent, dividends, interest,
or capital gains, are generally not subject to withholding either.39
Taxpayers earning significant amounts of such income may also have to
make quarterly estimated tax payments, although investment income is
generally not subject to payroll taxes.40
B. Traditional Arguments for Withholding
There is an obvious benefit to the government from tax withholding,
which is that tax compliance is demonstrably higher when it is present.
The compliance rate on wage income is near perfect at 99 percent,
meaning that 99 percent of the income tax on wages is reported and
paid to the government on time.41 In contrast, compliance for selfemployment income, when no withholding or third-party information
reporting is present, is less than 40 percent. In other words, more than
the half of the tax due on such income is not paid.42
Commentators have noted additional benefits from withholding. It
generally reduces compliance costs for taxpayers and simplifies their
obligations; at the same time, withholding reduces administrative costs
37 § 6654(a). To avoid a penalty, total estimated tax payments generally must be at
least 90 percent of the current year’s tax liability or 100 percent of the previous year’s
liability. See § 6654(d). However, the penalty doesn’t apply if the amount of taxed owed
is less than $1,000. See § 6654(e).
38 Self-employment taxes apply if an individual earns at least $400 during the year
from self-employment, at a rate of 12.4 percent for Social Security (subject to the same
$127,200 cap as for employee wages) and 2.9 percent for Medicare (subject to the same
additional 0.9 percent for earnings over $200,000). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TOPIC
554, SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX (2019), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc554.html.
39 However, certain foreign investors may be subject to backup withholding, under
which payers must withhold a fixed amount (currently 24 percent) when payees fail to
provide certain tax information. For a summary of these rules, see INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., BACKUP WITHHOLDING (2019), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businessesself-employed/backup-withholding.
40 See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Automation and the Income Tax,
10 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 3-4 (2018).
41 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR THE YEARS 2008-2010 5 n.3
(2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%
20through%202010.pdf [hereinafter I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES] (showing that income
subject to withholding has a net misreporting rate of only 1 percent).
42 See id. (finding a 63 percent misreporting rate for income subject to little or no
information reporting). The impact of third-party information reporting on compliance
is discussed further below. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
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for the IRS and speeds up tax collection for the government.43
Withholding also prevents taxpayers from overspending their wages
and failing to save enough money for taxes.44 Finally, withholding
ensures taxpayers pay some tax, even if they fail to file returns, and
brings taxpayers into the tax system (and onto the government’s radar)
who may otherwise go completely undetected.45 This also has an added
benefit to taxpayers in that withholding requires them to pay into Social
Security when they may otherwise not have done so.
C. Traditional Arguments Against Withholding
Notwithstanding these benefits, withholding has not received
universal support. Milton Friedman, credited for helping develop wage
withholding in the 1940s, famously announced his regret and called for
its repeal in later years.46 The problem, according to Friedman, is that
withholding makes it too easy for the government to collect taxes: by
making taxation less painful, the government is able to grow larger.47
Other commentators have also observed that withholding “numbs
workers to the pain of [paying] their taxes,” making the tax system less
transparent and therefore less democratic overall.48 Some members of
Congress have agreed with this sentiment as well, and lawmakers have
proposed several bills over the last few decades that would repeal
employee withholding altogether.49
Legal scholars have also not universally supported withholding. In a
1982 law review article, Professor Richard Doernberg laid out a case for
repealing withholding and allowing taxpayers to pay year-end taxes in

43 Slemrod, supra note 20, at 263; Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax
Withholding: A Comparative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 UC DAVIS L. REV. 107,
127 (1990).
44 Soos, supra note 43, at 127-30.
45 See id.
46 See Slemrod, supra note 20, at 251; Zelenak, supra note 23, at 12.
47 See Zelenak, supra note 23, at 12 (quoting the testimony of Milton Friedman at
the Meeting of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (Mar. 31, 2005)).
48 Jonah Goldberg, Automatic Tax Withholding, WASH. POST (May 2, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/liveblog/wp/2013/05/02/outlooks-fifth-annualspring-cleaning/.
49 See Zelenak, supra note 23, at 12 (describing a proposal by then House Speaker
Richard Armey in 1996). For proposed bills to repeal withholding on employee wages,
see Federal Withholding Tax Repeal Act of 2009, H.R. 1919, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009);
Cost of Government Awareness Act of 2001, H.R. 1364, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001);
Repeal the Withholding of Income Taxes and Require Individuals to Pay Estimated Taxes on
a Monthly Basis, H.R. 3343, 104th Congress (2d Sess. 1996).
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a lump sum.50 Doernberg first argues that withholding is inefficient and
costly. He notes that employers incur costs to compute withholding and
transmit funds to the government, employees incur costs because they
do not earn interest on overwithheld funds, and the IRS incurs costs
from having to process and send taxpayers refunds.51 Next, Doernberg
argues that withholding has numerous implementation issues. For
example, it requires the law to distinguish employees from independent
contractors and creates an incentive to misclassify workers as the
latter.52
Finally, Doernberg identifies several philosophical objections to
withholding. The first is that requiring regular tax payments through
withholding is contrary to the tax law’s annual accounting concept, the
idea that taxpayers are liable for their net income computed on an
annual basis.53 For example, a taxpayer who earns substantial wages in
the first half of the year will have taxes withheld, even though the
taxpayer might lose his job, experience deductible losses later in the
year, and ultimately have no net tax liability.54 Next, Doernberg notes
that withholding may have a regressive effect because withholding on
wages, but not on other sources of income (such as investment income
or self-employment), may force low-income workers to part with their
funds sooner than higher income taxpayers do.55 A third philosophical
objection to withholding is “its adverse effects on private savings and
investment since taxpayers must remit to the government money that
they might otherwise save.”56 Eliminating withholding, Doernberg
argues, might lead to greater savings.57

50

See Doernberg, supra note 8.
See id. at 604-07.
52 See id. at 610-15. Doernberg also argues that withholding creates a situation
where employers might “misuse the withholding trust funds, most or all of which might
have been paid directly to the government by the employees in the absence of
withholding.” Id. at 622.
53 Id. at 622-23.
54 See id. at 623.
55 Id. at 623-24. Doernberg also makes an argument that the withholding tables are
regressive, in part, because the withholding rates are lower than the top marginal tax rate,
such that the highest earning employees will pay less of their tax through withholding. Id.
While this was the case in the 1980s, today’s top withholding rates line up with the top
marginal rate (37 percent). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NOTICE
NO. 1036, EARLY RELEASE COPIES OF THE 2019 PERCENTAGE METHOD TABLES FOR INCOME TAX
WITHHOLDING (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/n1036.pdf.
56 Doernberg, supra note 8, at 624.
57 Id. at 625.
51
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D. Revisiting the Case for Withholding
Congress has made virtually no changes to the withholding rules
since the 1943 legislation enacting broad wage withholding. Those who
have advocated for its repeal have not been successful, and at the same
time, efforts to expand withholding have also failed.58 Yet, there is good
reason to revisit arguments for and against withholding in the modern
era. First and foremost, the advances in technology that have taken
place over the last several decades have fundamentally shifted the costbenefit calculus for tax remittance. As discussed below in Part II, many
of the withholding costs imposed on payers that commentators
previously identified as burdensome and unfair59 are simply not so
significant anymore with the availability of software and the Internet.
At the same time, technology has enabled a growing number of
individuals to obtain non-employment work via the gig economy.60 This
growth in non-employee arrangements, fueled by a burgeoning industry
of online platform companies, has resulted in more workers than ever
before being subject to tax remittance obligations without
withholding.61 As discussed in Part IV, the case for expanding
withholding is often strongest in such a scenario, when a single large
payer (e.g., a platform company like Uber) pays many individual payees
(e.g., Uber drivers).
The rise of technology alone calls into question many of the
arguments against withholding made by Professor Doernberg and
others. But an additional reason to reexamine the merits of withholding
is that there is a growing body of behavioral economics literature that
sheds light on why taxpayers may actually prefer withholding, even if it
goes against their pecuniary interests. Past scholarship has generally
focused only on the economic costs and benefits of withholding.62 By
incorporating the social science literature into our understanding of tax
withholding, we can gain a better picture of the overall cost-benefit
58

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., Gig Economy Data Hub, How Many Gig Workers Are There?, ASPEN INST.,
https://www.gigeconomydata.org/basics/how-many-gig-workers-are-there (last visited
Sept. 27, 2019) (compiling studies from multiple sources and concluding that over 25
percent of workers participate in “gig” work (i.e., freelancing) in some capacity).
61 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1430-31.
62 See Doernberg, supra note 8, at 604-07; Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 83049. Logue and Slemrod generally analyze an “optimal tax remittance regime” under
traditional economic principles. Id. at 800-02. However, they do note that behavioral
phenomena may impact their analysis and may also have “political economy
implications.” Id. at 848-49.
59
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analysis. If taxpayers prefer withholding and the government can collect
tax revenue more reliably and efficiently, withholding may present a
rare win-win scenario in the tax system.
The next Part of this Article examines the economic costs and benefits
of withholding in light of advances in technology. It generally argues
that, in many cases, withholding is the most efficient means of tax
collection. Part III then explores the various behavioral phenomena that
explain taxpayer preferences for withholding.
II.

THE ECONOMICS OF WITHHOLDING
A. Compliance Costs

If collecting taxes were costless, then policymakers should be neutral
as between a direct remittance system, where a taxpayer remits her own
taxes, or a withholding system, where the payer remits the taxes.63
However, there are costs to remitting taxes (“compliance costs”64), and
those costs are often higher when borne by the taxpayer payee, as
opposed to the payer.
To illustrate, consider a simple example. Assume that X Corporation
has 10 workers who each earn $10,000 per year for performing
services.65 Assume each worker has a tax rate of 20 percent, meaning
they each owe $2,000 in tax on their service income.
Consider first the direct remittance scenario, in which each worker
would be responsible for paying his $2,000 of tax liability to the
government directly. For now, assume that all of the workers report
honestly. Because income and payroll taxes are generally due
quarterly,66 each of the 10 workers must make a filing each quarter to
submit a portion of their tax liability. This will entail time and possibly
financial cost if the taxpayer uses software or a paid preparer to assist
63

See Slemrod, supra note 20, at 255-58.
Compliance costs include time spent by taxpayers dealing with tax obligations
(research, filling out forms, keeping records, etc.), money spent by taxpayers on tax
software or tax return preparation services, and costs incurred by third parties like
employers who must withhold and remit taxes on behalf of employees. See JOEL
SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES
230-31 (5th ed. 2017).
65 It is easier to leave aside the question of whether the workers are employees or
independent contractors for the sake of this hypothetical, because the former would be
subject to wage withholding under current law and the latter would not. See supra notes
27, 35 and accompanying text.
66 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ESTIMATED TAXES, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/estimated-taxes (last updated June 3, 2019).
64
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her in meeting this obligation. For example, it may cost each worker
$50 and 1 hour of time to meet their tax payment obligations each year.
If we assume the opportunity cost of one hour of each worker’s time is
also $50, the total cost would be $100 per worker.67 This cost would be
separate from, and in addition to, the cost of filing the worker’s yearend tax return. In this example, the total compliance cost of a direct
remittance would be $1,000 for ten taxpayers.
Now consider a withholding system in which X Corporation
withholds and pays the $2,000 of tax for each worker on a quarterly
basis. X Corporation may use a payroll software program that charges a
flat rate (say $100) for any withholding and an additional amount (say
$10/person) for each worker, for a total cost of $200 in this example of
ten taxpayers. The additional time incurred may be zero if the software
withholds based on information already collected for payroll purposes.
The example, admittedly simplified, illustrates a larger point. In many
cases, the payer would have declining marginal compliance costs. In
other words, the payer would have to make a larger initial outlay to
withhold taxes, but each additional payee would add only a minor cost.
This is evidenced in the way that software programs generally bill for
withholding services: most charge a fixed rate for the service with a
much lower cost per additional employee.68 By comparison, each
individual payee would incur his or her own individual “start up” cost,
which would be repeated for every worker.
The simple example also likely underestimates compliance costs for
many payees. An employee with a flat tax rate of 20 percent could easily
calculate the tax due on a quarter’s worth of wages. But, in reality, many
taxpayers, particularly the self-employed, do not know what their
overall tax rate will be before the end of the year and might incur
additional time or resources to make this calculation. Estimating their
net income for the quarter might also entail additional complexity if
they incur deductible business expenses.69
67 One way to measure the value of a worker’s time is based on their foregone income.
For example, if a worker earns $50/hour from working and must forego one hour of work
to deal with tax compliance obligations, we can quantify that cost as $50. See, e.g., Erica
York, TAX FOUND., REVIEWING DIFFERENT METHODS OF CALCULATING TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS
3 (Aug. 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180821100528/Reviewing-DifferentMethods-of-Calculating-Tax-Compliance-Costs.pdf.
68 See, e.g., Pricing, GUSTO, https://gusto.com/product/pricing (last visited Sept. 27,
2019); Pricing, ONPAY, https://payrollcenter.com/onpay/costs (last visited Sept. 27,
2019); Full Service Payroll, PATRIOTSOFTWARE, https://www.patriotsoftware.com/
payroll/services/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
69 However, taxpayers can avoid an estimated tax penalty by basing their estimated
tax payments on the previous year’s tax liability. See I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1)(B) (2018).
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The point illustrated by the example is that economies of scale will
often make withholding by larger payers cheaper than direct remittance
by payees.70 In addition, larger payers are more likely to have invested
in technology that minimizes the cost of tax remittance. Returning to
the example above, when X Corporation hires 10 workers, it might
invest in payroll software to handle compensation matters. Apart from
taxes, the software would allow the company to do things like direct
deposit paychecks, track hours and overtime, and reimburse business
expenses. Due to these cost-saving advantages, X Corporation might
invest in the software even without an obligation to withhold and remit
taxes for its workers. Most payroll software programs, however, would
also handle tax withholding at no additional cost.71
This can be thought of as another form of declining marginal cost of
tax compliance available to larger payers. The first point is that a
company with multiple workers can remit tax more cheaply than each
worker remitting her own tax because there is a declining marginal cost
for each additional worker. But further, large businesses incur
numerous payroll-related costs apart from taxes, and additional payroll
functions (like tax withholding) also impose smaller marginal costs.
Note, this analysis holds whether X Corporation performs these
functions in house with the help of software or whether it hires an
outside payroll company.
In contrast, individual payees may not have comparable investments
in software or third-party payroll services that would reduce the cost of
tax remittance. While many individuals use online tax return
preparation services or similar software,72 those programs generally do
not handle quarterly estimated tax payments, nor do some tax return
preparers.73 While financial management software like QuickBooks for
70

See Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 834.
Most payroll software programs include tax withholding in their software
packages. See, e.g., Full-Service, Flexible Payroll, GUSTO, https://gusto.com/product/
payroll-features (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); Payroll Software That Does It All, ONPAY,
https://onpay.com/payroll-software (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); Mike Kappel, What Is
Withholding for Federal Income Taxes?, PATRIOTSOFTWARE: PAYROLL BLOG (Apr. 12,
2017), https://www.patriotsoftware.com/payroll/training/blog/what-is-withholding/.
72 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-297, TAX ADMINISTRATION: MANY
TAXPAYERS RELY ON TAX SOFTWARE AND IRS NEEDS TO ASSESS ASSOCIATED RISKS 1 (2009)
(“In 2007, over 39 million income tax returns were prepared by individuals using
commercial tax software such as TurboTax, TaxCut, or TaxAct, and more than 66
percent of those returns were then filed electronically.”).
73 For example, the basic tax package from Intuit TurboTax will handle preparation
of tax forms for individual wage earners subject to withholding by their employers.
However, if an individual payee wants to calculate and pay their estimated quarterly
taxes electronically, they must purchase the more expensive QuickBooks Self-Employed
71
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individual business owners may help handle tax remittance
obligations,74 only a minority of self-employed individuals appears to
use such programs.75 This is not to say that making estimated tax
payments is prohibitively expensive for individual taxpayers, even when
they do not use software or online programs to handle accounting
matters. Rather, the point is that tax remittance obligations incurred by
individuals are more likely to be standalone costs, which in the
aggregate, would outweigh the marginal costs incurred by larger payers
to add withholding to their payroll costs.
B. Tax Evasion and Other Sources of Nonpayment
As discussed in the previous section, requiring X Corporation to
withhold taxes for its 10 workers may impose fewer compliance costs
than having the 10 employees directly remit their tax liability. Even if
the government collects identical amounts of tax revenue in either
scenario, the policy that imposes fewer net social costs is generally more
desirable.76 However, it is far from clear that the government would
collect the same amount of revenue in either scenario. Rather, in many
cases, direct remittance by payees likely results in more tax evasion than
withholding by payers. Further, direct remittance likely results in more
unintentional nonpayment of tax as well.
As discussed above, 99 percent of employee wage income is
accurately reported to the IRS.77 However, just because an employer
withholds taxes on wage income for its employees, does not mean the
funds end up in the government’s hands. Employers could
misappropriate or otherwise fail to remit withheld tax funds.78 But there
package. See Lisa Lewis, Self-Employed? Don’t Forget About the Estimated Tax Deadline,
INTUIT TURBOTAX BLOG (Sept. 9, 2019), https://blog.turbotax.intuit.com/selfemployed/self-employed-dont-forget-about-the-estimated-tax-deadline-19852/.
74 See, e.g., QuickBooks Self-Employed, INTUIT QUICKBOOKS, https://quickbooks.
intuit.com/oa/selfemployed/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019) (stating that the “SelfEmployed Tax Bundle” will allow clients to “[p]ay quarterly estimated taxes online
directly from QuickBooks” and give clients access to “[o]ne state and one federal tax
return filing”).
75 See Michal Clements, QuickBooks Enjoys 80% Market Share with 29 Million Small
Businesses but Keeps on Growing, CHICAGONOW, (Apr. 14, 2015, 7:00 AM),
http://www.chicagonow.com/marketing-strategist/2015/04/quickbooks-enjoys-80-marketshare-with-29-million-small-businesses-but-keeps-on-growing/ (stating that 5 million selfemployed businesses use financial management software while 15 million do not).
76 Cf. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 235.
77 See I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES, supra note 41.
78 See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 731-33 (2007). Professor Lederman explains that
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are significant penalties intended to deter such mistreatment of
withheld taxes.79 While some employers do not comply with their
withholding or remittance obligations, this does not appear to make up
a significant portion of the tax gap.80 In other words, when withholding
is imposed under our current system, it appears to be an extremely
effective way to ensure that the government collects tax owed.
How does the government fare in situations where there is no
withholding? It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to evaluate the
effectiveness of withholding in isolation. This is due to the fact that,
under the current U.S. system, withholding is always accompanied by
third-party information reporting. Information reporting refers to the
reporting of tax information (usually income, but sometimes deductible
expenses) by third parties to both taxpayers and the IRS.81 For example,
when a taxpayer earns interest income on her bank account, the bank
may send her a Form 1099-INT, a copy of which is also sent to the IRS.
Employees are subject to both information reporting and withholding:
their employer holds back taxes from each paycheck (withholding) and
also sends a Form W-2 to the employee and the IRS at year-end
(information reporting).82
Information reporting has proven to be a highly effective enforcement
mechanism. IRS data indicates that income subject to substantial
information reporting is accurately reported at a rate of 93 percent.83
This includes income like interest, dividends, pensions, and annuities.
In contrast, only 37 percent of income not subject to information
reported is accurately reported to the IRS, including income from selfemployment, farming income, and rental income.84 As explained by
collusion is less of an issue in employer-employee withholding because employers have
an incentive to report wages that result in a tax deduction. Id. at 729. The issue on the
employer side tends to be a failure to remit withheld funds, often because the business
is failing or otherwise needs money. Id. at 732. Professor Lederman further notes that
such evasion “generally is easier for the IRS to detect without an audit than collusion is
because the former lacks the employee’s collaboration.” Id.
79 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2019) (imposing a penalty equal to 100 percent of
the tax that is willfully unpaid by a party required to withhold).
80 For example, only 5.1 percent of the total civil penalties assessed by the IRS in
2017 were the result of employers’ failing to pay their employees’ withheld taxes. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 55B, DATA BOOK, 2017 42-43
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17databk.pdf.
81 See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1736-39 (2010).
82 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 275.
83 I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES, supra note 41, at 5 (showing a net misreporting
percentage of 7 percent for income subject to substantial information reporting).
84 See id.
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Professor Leandra Lederman, information reporting reduces tax evasion
in two ways.85 One is that it allows for direct detection of noncompliant
taxpayers. The IRS employs an automated matching program that cross
checks individual tax returns with information returns.86 For example,
a taxpayer who reports zero interest income on his tax return, but who
received a Form 1099-INT showing $1,000 of interest income, would
be flagged by the IRS’s computer system. Beyond actual detection,
information reporting also appears to serve as a powerful deterrence
mechanism.87 Knowing that the IRS is receiving third-party information
about their income appears to motivate taxpayers to report the vast
majority of income that shows up on information statements.
The challenge, then, is determining how much of the near perfect
compliance rate observed for wage income is attributable to
withholding and how much is attributable to information reporting
alone. In isolation, the IRS data suggests nearly all of the compliance
advantage comes from information reporting: there is a mere 6
percentage point difference between compliance rates observed for
(1) withholding and information reporting together (99 percent), and
(2) information reporting alone (93 percent).88 At first glance, it is easy
to dismiss the importance of withholding based on these statistics.
However, the IRS data does not necessarily tell the full story.
Another way to think about the impact of withholding apart from
information reporting is by asking the following question: Would we
observe a 93 percent compliance rate among wage earners if employers
simply reported wage information to the IRS but did not withhold taxes
for their employees? The answer is far from clear, and there is good
reason to doubt compliance would be so high. One important driver of
the high compliance rates among taxpayers subject to withholding
appears to be that withholding puts most people in a refund position.89
In other words, most employees overpay their tax liability through
withholding and claim a refund at the end of the year when they file
their tax return. This is relevant because a number of empirical studies
have shown that taxpayers who claim a refund when they file their tax
85

See Lederman, supra note 81, at 1738-39.
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 275-76.
87 See Lederman, supra note 81, at 1739 (comparing information reporting to “red
light cameras” that make drivers aware they are being watched).
88 See supra notes 77, 83 and accompanying text; see also Lederman, supra note 81,
at 1736 (“Withholding is well known to be highly effective in ensuring payment, but
IRS data show that information reporting in the absence of withholding is almost as
effective.”).
89 See Thomas, supra note 34, at 115 n.33.
86
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returns are less likely to cheat as compared to taxpayers who owe a
balance.90
It is hard to know how much the presence of a refund versus a balance
due (or “framing”91) impacts observed tax compliance levels in the
United States. One thing we do know is that the majority of taxpayers
— nearly 80 percent — claim a refund when they file their tax return.92
This means that many, if not most, taxpayers earning interest,
dividends, and other income subject to information reporting are likely
earning such income in addition to wage income. This also means that,
in many cases, taxes on income like dividends and interest merely
reduce taxpayers’ refunds rather than cause a balance to be owed.
Empirical research suggests that such taxpayers are already likely to
report honestly, and this likely combines with the already existing
deterrent effect of information reporting.93
For example, consider a taxpayer who overpaid taxes on her wage
income by $3,000 due to withholding. Assume she has received a Form
1099-INT showing $1,000 of interest income, resulting in $300 of
additional tax on that interest. If she reports the interest, she will not
owe a balance when she files her tax return, but rather will reduce her
refund from $3,000 to $2,700. In this case, IRS compliance data and
90 See, e.g., Paul Corcoro & Peter Adelsheim, A Balance Due Before Remittance: The
Effect on Reporting Compliance, in RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND
COMPLIANCE: SELECTED PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 2010 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE (2010),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10rescon.pdf; Richard Dusenbury, The Effect of
Prepayment Position on Individual Taxpayers’ Preferences for Risky Tax-Filing Options, J.
AM. TAX’N ASS’N, Spring 1994, at 2; Henk Elffers & Dick J. Hessing, Influencing the
Prospects of Tax Evasion, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289 (1997); Henry S.J. Robben et al.,
Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax Cheating, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
341 (1990).
The results of these studies can be explained by prospect theory. The decision-making
theory, developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, posits that individuals tend
to view outcomes as either gains or losses relative to a neutral reference point, a
phenomenon known as “framing.” See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 272-73 (1972),
reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 27-28 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000). Prospect theory predicts that individuals facing a gains frame tend
make risk-averse choices, while those facing a loss frame tend to exhibit risk-seeking
behavior. Id. at 22-23.
91 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 276. Additionally, 86 percent of all
personal federal income tax liability is collected through withholding. Id. See also
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS COMPLETE REPORT 6-10, Table A (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p1304.pdf; Thomas, supra note 34, at 115 n.33.
93 See Thomas, supra note 34, at 116 n.34.
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research on refunds both indicate that the taxpayer is highly likely to
report the interest income accurately.
This may not be the case, however, for a taxpayer not already owed a
refund. Imagine, instead, a self-employed taxpayer who owes the IRS
$3,000 of tax on her business income when she files her tax return.
Assume this taxpayer also earned $1,000 of interest on which she owes
an additional $300 of tax. On the one hand, deterrence theory predicts
that the taxpayer will pay the $300 in tax due on the interest because
she will (rightfully) fear getting caught if she does not. On the other
hand, she may be more tempted to underreport because she is already
facing a loss,94 and empirical studies indicate taxpayers in her position
are more likely to cheat. One strategy she might employ is to report the
$1,000 interest income, but to (falsely) report $1,000 less in taxable
business income, so that her total tax liability remains $3,000.
The larger point here is that it is difficult to untangle the deterrent
effect of information reporting from the framing benefit offered by
withholding. If there is significant overlap between taxpayers who claim
refunds and taxpayers who report income subject to information
reporting but not withholding, then there is reason to believe that at
least some portion of high compliance is due to framing effects
combined with the deterrent effect of information reports. It follows,
then, that if withholding were completely eliminated, such that virtually
no taxpayers claimed refunds, compliance even in the presence of
substantial information reporting would decline.
Even without the presence of a refund, a recent empirical study
suggests withholding encourages better tax compliance.95 The study
involved businesses in Costa Rica that were subject to sales tax
withholding by credit card companies.96 For the vast majority of
businesses, additional sales tax was due with the return (i.e., taxpayers
did not claim refunds).97 The study’s authors examined the impact of a
2011 legal reform that roughly doubled the rate of sales tax withholding
by the credit card companies to determine how it affected overall tax
compliance by the businesses.98 The impact of the withholding change
was significant: among taxpayers whose withholding rates increased,
94 Prospect theory would predict that the taxpayer would be more willing to take a
risk if she was facing a loss. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 90, at 22-23.
95 See Anne Brockmeyer & Marco Hernandez, Taxation, Information, and
Withholding: Evidence from Costa Rica (Feb. 7, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
96 The study looked at both corporations and self-employed individuals. Id. at 3.
97 See id. at 30-31 n.53.
98 Id. at 27.
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total tax remittances increased by 39 percent.99 In other words,
withholding more tax resulted in more tax being paid overall.
Again, these taxpayers were not claiming refunds, but instead had a
portion of their tax withheld and paid another portion in connection
with a sales tax return. Perhaps counterintuitively, the government’s act
of increasing the withheld portion of the tax due resulted in taxpayers’
paying more sales tax overall, even though taxpayers could have held
their overall tax remittance constant by reporting less tax due with their
return. But the businesses did not appear to make these adjustments,
nor did they avoid the use of credit card machines to escape the extra
withholding.100
Taken together, the Costa Rican study and the studies on tax refunds
suggest that withholding reduces tax evasion and has a positive impact
on voluntary compliance. This sheds doubt on whether compliance
levels would stay above 90 percent if we eliminated withholding but
retained information reporting for taxpayers like employees. Further,
unintentional noncompliance would likely become a much bigger issue
than it is now in the absence of withholding. Specifically, without
withholding, many taxpayers would likely fail to budget properly for
taxes and simply not have the cash on hand to meet their tax
obligations. This is a well-documented issue for smaller independent
contractors such as gig economy workers.101
Concededly, unintentional noncompliance does not appear to be an
issue for taxpayers receiving interest, dividends, and other similar
income subject to information reporting but not withholding, as such
income has a 93 percent compliance rate.102 But there are two potential
explanations that suggest this compliance level would not necessarily
apply if withholding were repealed altogether. One is the point made

99

Id. at 29-30.
See id. at 28, 31. The authors suggest two reasons for the response to the
withholding increase. First, some taxpayers simply failed to claim credit for the extra
withholding on their tax returns, so the increased remittance was merely a “default”
effect. Id. at 32-33. But for many others, there was a true increase in reported tax
liability, even though credit was claimed for taxes withheld. Id. at 33. For these
taxpayers, the authors suggest an increase in the perception of enforcement is the most
likely explanation. Id. at 33-34. Even though actual audit rates did not change, perhaps
these taxpayers viewed the change in withholding policy as a signal that the government
was more closely monitoring sales tax compliance. See id.
101 See, e.g., Caroline Bruckner, Shortchanged: The Tax Compliance Challenges of Small
Business Operators Driving the On-Demand Platform Economy, KOGOD TAX POL’Y CTR. 11
(May 2016), http://www.american.edu/kogod/news/shortchanged.cfm; Thomas, supra note
5, at 1420, 1430-31.
102 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
100
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above that high compliance for things like interest and dividends might
be driven, in part, by the framing effects created by tax refunds.
But even putting aside framing, taxpayers who earn the type of
income subject to substantial information reporting, largely investment
income like interest, dividends, and annuities, likely earn more income
and are more liquid than the average taxpayer. While some taxpayers103
might earn investment income in a tax-advantaged account like a
401(k) or an Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”), those savings
vehicles do not generate taxable income before withdrawal.104 The
taxpayers receiving Form 1099 with significant amounts of taxable
investment income — like interest, dividends, and annuities — are a
smaller, wealthier number.105 For those taxpayers, budgeting and
liquidity issues are less likely to be an obstacle when they file their tax
return. In other words, we can expect wealthier taxpayers who earn
taxable investment income subject to information reporting to be able
to afford to pay their tax bills. We might not have the same expectations
about less wealthy workers who earn wages or other income if
withholding is not present.
There are no serious proposals at present to repeal withholding for
wage earners.106 The purpose of considering the consequences of repeal
is to try to evaluate how important withholding is in isolation. One
potential critique of the argument that withholding promotes tax
compliance is that much, if not all, of the benefit we observe from
withholding merely comes from the information reporting that
accompanies it. However, withholding likely has valuable compliance
benefits that are completely independent of information reporting. In
sum, a withholding system likely results in better compliance, i.e., less

103 Fewer than half of households aged 55 and older have any retirement savings.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST
HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS 7 (2015); see also James M.
Poterba, Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, Were They Prepared for Retirement? Financial
Status at Advanced Ages in the HRS and AHEAD Cohorts 40 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17824, 2012) (explaining that 46 percent of households die with
less than $10,000 in assets).
104 See, e.g., 401(k) Plan Overview, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/401k-resource-guide-plan-participants-401kplan-overview (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
105 See Arthur B. Kennickell, Ponds and Streams: Wealth and Income in the U.S., 1989 to
2007 25 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2009-13,
2009), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200913/200913pap.pdf.
106 But see supra note 49 (citing bills to repeal withholding proposed in 1996, 2001,
and 2009).
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tax evasion, than a direct remittance system, even if information
reporting is present.
C. Enforcement Costs
Yet another cost that will often be lower in the presence of tax
withholding is that of government enforcement. To ensure that income
taxes are paid in an accurate and timely manner, the government must
expend resources to audit taxpayers and to prosecute and/or penalize
offenders.107 Consider, again, the example of X Corporation that pays
10 workers for services, each of whom earns $10,000 and owes $2,000
of tax. In a direct remittance system, the IRS would have to monitor
each worker’s compliance with their $2,000 tax obligation, along with
monitoring X Corporation’s compliance with its own tax obligations. In
contrast, a withholding system allows the IRS to monitor a smaller pool
of people; in this example, the government could monitor X
Corporation alone to account for all of the tax due. (Although
technically the X Corporation workers could still underreport their tax
liability even in the presence of withholding, the data tells us this
generally does not happen.108) And not only is it cheaper to audit fewer
taxpayers, auditing X Corporation is likely less costly than auditing
individuals, because X Corporation is more likely to have well-kept
books and records as compared to the individual workers.109
In the absence of withholding, the government must not only audit
and penalize offenders, but it also must educate taxpayers about their
tax obligations to encourage timely payment. Quarterly estimated tax
obligations are confusing for many taxpayers, and the IRS has devoted
increased resources in recent years to educate taxpayers about how to
stay compliant in the absence of withholding.110 On the other hand,
taxpayers who remit their taxes through withholding will inevitably
need less assistance and education.
Finally, as noted by Professors Kyle Logue and Joel Slemrod, direct
remittance may result in higher enforcement costs because individual
taxpayers are more likely to be judgment proof than large payers.111 In
the absence of withholding, some (possibly many) taxpayers will
inevitably fail to remit their tax liability and ultimately the government
107

See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1430.
See I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
109 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 276; Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at
837-38.
110 See, e.g., I.R.S News Release IR-2016-110 (Aug. 22, 2016).
111 See Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 837.
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will have to attempt to collect it. To the extent some taxpayers spend
their money as they earn it and do not have any savings or assets, the
government will be unable to collect.112 The government generally can
avoid this issue when it collects taxes through withholding. Not only is
it less likely that the IRS encounters a judgment-proof problem from a
larger payer,113 but it does not have to engage in costly procedures like
liens or levies114 to collect the tax owed.
In sum, there are several reasons why withholding may cost far less,
from an economic standpoint, than direct remittance. Particularly when
a larger entity pays multiple, smaller payees, both compliance costs and
IRS enforcement costs will likely be lower in a withholding system. This
is because large payers will usually incur declining marginal compliance
costs for additional payees and have sophisticated software already in
place for payroll and recordkeeping, which in turn makes them easier
to audit. On the other hand, individual payees are less likely to have
payroll software in place and compliance and enforcement costs must
be replicated for each taxpayer. Additionally, studies show evasion is
generally lower when withholding is present.115
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE SUPPORT FOR WITHHOLDING
Part II argued that withholding is often more cost-effective as
compared to direct remittance from an economic perspective. This Part
now turns to an independent justification for withholding derived from
social science research. Specifically, it examines why individuals may
prefer withholding to direct remittance, and argues that the former may
enhance overall welfare.
A preference for withholding is somewhat counterintuitive because,
from a time value of money perspective, withholding puts taxpayers at
a disadvantage compared to direct remittance. One reason is that
withholding results in taxes being paid earlier: withholding generally
applies every time taxpayers are paid, often bi-weekly, whereas
estimated taxes paid directly by taxpayers are due only once per quarter.
112

See id.
Of course, even large corporations could also go bankrupt and become judgmentproof. See id.
114 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 594, THE IRS
COLLECTION PROCESS (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p594.pdf.
115 On the other hand, withholding is less likely to be cost-effective in the case of
payments between individuals of similar income level and sophistication. Withholding
is also less likely to be effective when collusion is likely to be present, i.e., when neither
party to the transaction has an incentive to report the transaction to the IRS. These
general principles are discussed below in Part IV.
113
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The other reason is that most taxpayers subject to withholding overpay
their taxes during the year and claim refunds, and those refunds do not
bear interest.116 Thus, under a withholding system, the government
benefits because it is able to collect tax sooner117 and has use of
taxpayers’ additional funds, interest free. Economic theory would
predict, then, that governments should prefer withholding (assuming it
is can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner) and taxpayers should
resist withholding. Instead, taxpayers should want to control their
funds as long as possible, earn interest on those funds, and remit tax as
late as possible.
Yet, surprisingly, numerous studies reveal this is not the case as far as
taxpayers are concerned.118 Instead, withholding presents a rare
instance in which the government’s and the taxpayer’s interests often
align. It appears that many taxpayers prefer to make advanced
payments, rather than retaining their funds as long as possible. And it
further appears that taxpayers prefer overpayments. Although it could
be argued that these preferences are irrational from an economic point
of view, when factoring in psychological costs, they may be perfectly
rational. The sections below explore social science research that sheds
light on why many taxpayers may display preferences for withholding
instead of direct remittance.
Part III.A describes research that examines preferences regarding
payments of debt. In general, this research reveals that people like to
pay debts sooner rather than later, and that they prefer making multiple
small payments as opposed to fewer large payments. Together, these
findings support the notion that many taxpayers would prefer
withholding from each paycheck as opposed to quarterly estimated
taxes, and certainly as compared to making a single lump sum payment
at year-end. Part III.B then examines preferences for overwithholding,
that is, not just paying taxes through withholding, but paying more tax
than what is due and claiming a refund at year-end.
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See Thomas, supra note 34, at 115 n.33.
Although employers don’t necessarily remit tax to the IRS at the same time that
they withhold tax from their employees’ paychecks, withheld taxes must be remitted to
the government either monthly or semi-weekly, whereas estimated tax payments are
due only quarterly. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Employment Tax Due Dates,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employment-tax-duedates (last visited July 20, 2018).
118 See, e.g., studies cited infra notes 137, 164, 180 (observing individual preferences
for frequent payments of debt and for overpayments accompanied by refunds).
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A. Withholding and the Psychology of Paying
Paying taxes is psychologically painful. Research suggests that
Americans do not like the way the government spends their money, that
they worry that rich people do not pay enough in taxes, and that they
generally exhibit “tax aversion.”119 But apart from the fact that tax
payments may evoke one’s negative views about the tax system, paying
taxes represents a true economic loss that is painful in any event.
Numerous studies by psychologists and economists confirm the fairly
intuitive fact that, in any context, paying is painful.120 However,
research also suggests that certain forms of payment appear to mitigate
the pain of paying. When it comes to paying taxes, these mitigating
factors are far more likely to be present in the context of withholding as
opposed to direct remittance.
1.

Advanced Payments Versus Debt

Empirical studies show that many people prefer to pay their debts
sooner rather than later, even though economic theory predicts that
they should want to defer financial obligations as far into the future as
possible.121 For example, in one survey, more respondents preferred to
prepay for a vacation rather than pay an identical amount after the
vacation, despite “an implicit interest penalty of about $50.”122 In other
words, even though people could earn interest on their funds if they
delayed payment for the vacation, and would not owe interest by
delaying payment, they preferred to pay sooner anyway.
One potential explanation for this preference is “debt aversion.”123 It
appears that the idea of debt is psychologically painful and people tend
to enjoy getting rid of it as quickly as possible.124 For example, a person
might enjoy their vacation more if the thought of paying for it is not
hanging over them during the trip, even though they could have earned
119 See, e.g., Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax
Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 75, 75-76 (2003); Yair
Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government
Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 179 (2013).
120 See, e.g., Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental
Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4, 4 (1998) (describing the “pain of
paying”).
121 See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal
Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 182 (1989). This assumes people do not owe interest on
the debt that exceeds their rate of return on investments; if so, paying sooner is rational.
122 Prelec & Loewenstein, supra note 120, at 6.
123 Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 121, at 187.
124 See Prelec & Loewenstein, supra note 120, at 5.

108

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:81

some interest if they paid later. The foregone interest might be worth
the extra psychological enjoyment of not thinking about the debt.
Similarly, consumers generally enjoy token systems that allow for
prepaying, such as casino chips or drink tokens at a resort.125
Individuals also commonly pay off debt like student loans earlier than
required, even if the interest rate is lower than what they could
otherwise earn on their investments.126
In the context of making tax payments, withholding likely has appeal
for people who are debt-averse. As discussed above in Part II,
withholding taxes from each paycheck allows taxpayers to make tax
payments sooner and, for most, allows them to avoid year-end balances.
Although people who pay quarterly estimated taxes can also aim to
overpay their taxes and avoid a year-end balance, this form of payment
may feel more like psychologically painful debt for several reasons.
First, estimated tax payments are generally made less frequently, so the
prospect of a tax bill looms over the taxpayer for several months at a
time. Second, it may be harder to avoid a balance due with estimated
taxes because taxpayers may be unsure of their final tax liability.
2.

Small Payments Versus Large Payments

In addition to paying debts early, splitting a large payment into
multiple smaller payments appears to reduce the psychological pain of
paying. Studies show that, in general, individuals prefer to segregate a
larger loss into smaller losses that occur apart in time. For example, in
one study, subjects were asked to contemplate a situation where a
person received two tax bills totaling $150: one bill from the federal tax
authority for $100 and another bill from the state tax authority for
$50.127 A majority surveyed indicated that it would be more desirable to
receive the letters two weeks apart rather than receiving the letters on
the same day.128 The authors of the study found similar results, i.e., a
desire to segregate losses into different time periods, for both large and
small losses and both monetary and non-monetary losses.129
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See id. at 19.
Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 121, at 187.
127 Richard H. Thaler & Eric J. Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and Trying
to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 643, 649
(1990).
128 See id.
129 See id.
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Another study also found that subjects prefer to separate financial
losses into different days, whether the loss was large or small.130 The
study’s authors suggest that the preference to segregate losses may be
attributable to limited “loss buffering resources.”131 Under this theory,
individuals have limited mental resources to cope with loss. While one’s
mental resources may be consumed by one loss, the passage of time
replenishes those resources, allowing the person to better cope with a
second loss.132
Marketers have capitalized on similar findings in the context of
consumers. Research has shown that framing a larger payment as a
collection of very small “pennies-a-day” payments makes a consumer
transaction more attractive.133 One well-known example is the
marketing campaign of the Christian Children’s Fund, in which Sally
Struthers urged viewers to feed a starving child for only 70 cents a
day.134 Other studies similarly confirm that individuals are significantly
more likely to donate funds to a worthy cause when a payroll deduction
is framed as 85 cents per day versus $300 per year, and they are willing
to pay more for a magazine subscription framed as a per-issue price
versus a total annual price.135
Tax withholding similarly allows taxpayers to break up their tax
payments into smaller payments that are spaced apart in time. Like the
subjects in the study who preferred to pay a $100 federal tax bill on a
different day than a $50 state tax bill,136 taxpayers may experience less
psychological loss from paying their income taxes this way.137
130 Patricia W. Linville & Gregory W. Fischer, Preferences for Separating or
Combining Events, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 18 (1991). Large financial losses
involved losing an airline ticket worth $250 and incurring $200 worth of damage to a
stereo system; small losses involved losing a book that had just been purchased for $5
and losing a $5 bill. Id. at 22.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 9.
133 John T. Gourville, Pennies-a-Day: The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction
Evaluation, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 395, 395 (1998).
134 See id.; see also Mycommercials, Sally Struthers Christian Children’s Fund Commercial
(1987), YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePENcrE_xcQ.
135 Gourville, supra note 133, at 396. In the study, subjects were asked to report a
fair price; the average per issue price selected was $1.47, which resulted in an annual
price of $76.25, while the average annual price selected was just $38.65. Id. at 396.
136 See Thaler & Johnson, supra note 127, at 649.
137 Cf. Valrie Chambers & Anthony P. Curatola, Could Increasing the Frequency of
Estimated Tax Payments Decrease Delinquency Rates Among The Self-Employed?, 20
ADVANCES TAX’N 1 (2012) (observing that when presented with the option, subjects
generally preferred monthly as opposed to quarterly tax payments, and monthly
payments resulted in better tax compliance).
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On the other hand, the tax system does not offer self-employed
taxpayers, or other taxpayers not subject to withholding, an easy
method to break up their tax liability into many small payments. A
disciplined taxpayer may be able to self-impose such a system by
moving a fixed, small amount into a separate bank account each time
he receives a paycheck. But there is no good evidence that most
taxpayers exhibit this self-control.138 Further, even taxpayers who
manage to save money from each paycheck for taxes in small increments
must then make a larger, lump sum payment to the IRS for quarterly
taxes. Overall, the fact that individuals prefer to segregate losses likely
makes withholding more desirable than direct remittance for many
individuals.
3.

Flat Payments

Consumers also appear to prefer making flat, predictable payments as
compared to variable payments, even if they ultimately pay more in the
former scenario.139 For example, a study of internet customers revealed
that they generally preferred pre-paying for services at a flat monthly
rate, as opposed to paying for their actual internet use each month.140
Survey responses from the consumers revealed several explanations for
the flat rate preference. First, the flat rate was viewed as “insurance”
against the risk of incurring higher than expected costs based on actual
usage.141 Second, consumers report enjoying their internet usage more
if they are not worrying about costs increasing with every minute used,
the so called “taxi meter effect.”142 (The taxi ride is thought to be less
enjoyable if one must watch the meter ticking away.143) Finally, the

138 See Richard H. Thaler & H. M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J.
POL. ECON. 392, 392 (arguing that individuals, embodying conflicting economic roles
as “farsighted planners” and “myopic doers,” generally lack adequate self-control to
exhibit good saving behaviors).
139 See Anja Lambrecht & Bernd Skiera, Paying Too Much and Being Happy About It:
Existence, Causes, and Consequences of Tariff Choice Biases, 43 J. MARKETING RES. 212,
212 (2006).
140 See id. at 215. The study found that “more than half of the consumers with a flatrate bias paid at least 100% more than they would have paid on the least costly tariff.”
Id.
141 Id. at 221-22 (summarizing findings); see id. at 213 (describing the “insurance
effect”).
142 Id. at 221-22 (summarizing findings and survey questions); see id. at 213-14
(describing the “taxi meter effect”).
143 See id. at 214.
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study found that consumers simply overestimate their actual internet
usage.144
In the context of internet usage, the study reveals consumers are
willing to pay a premium to simply not have to worry about how much
they will owe in a given month. This is consistent with other research
indicating that paying is psychologically painful and that individuals are
generally debt-averse. In the same way that advanced payments make a
vacation more enjoyable, it appears that regular fixed payments (as
opposed to variable payments) also reduce psychological discomfort.
Although withholding often does not necessarily involve a flat tax
payment, taxes are often withheld at a fixed rate. There may also be a
“taxi meter effect” when it comes to paying taxes. Just as flat utility rates
allow consumers to enjoy services without constantly worrying about
payment, regular withholding may allow taxpayers to derive more
pleasure out of their paycheck as compared to receiving higher gross
payments that they know will later be subject to taxes. Similarly, the
“insurance effect,” whereby internet users display preferences to pay
higher flat rates to insure against surprising losses, is consistent with
taxpayers’ overall preferences (discussed further below) to overpay their
taxes to avoid a large balance.
4.

The Endowment Effect and Mental Accounting

Withholding may also make paying taxes less painful because
taxpayers do not view withheld taxes as a loss but, rather, as money that
was never theirs to begin with,145 an extension of the so-called
“endowment effect.” In essence, the endowment effect describes the
idea that we value an item that we own (i.e., an item that is part of our
endowment) more highly than we would value the same item if we did
not own it.146 Studies of the endowment effect show, for example, that
subjects demand a much higher price to sell a mug or a pen that they

144

See id. at 214, 221-22.
See, e.g., EYAL ZAMIR, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS
AVERSION 156 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (“A taxpayer who receives a taxable income
and then pays the tax plausibly experiences the payment as a loss. In contrast, when the
tax is deducted at the source, the taxpayer is much more likely to regard her net
payment as the reference point, thus framing the deducted tax as an unobtained gain.”);
Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG. 253,
277 (2011).
146 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 293 (2011).
145
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own, as compared to the price that other subjects are willing to pay to
acquire the same mug or pen.147
The endowment effect offers another potential explanation as to why
taxpayers may prefer withholding instead of direct remittance. When
taxes are withheld, taxpayers are never in possession of the withheld
funds. Logically, then, taxpayers may not view withheld taxes are part
of their “endowment,” which means they may not experience a
psychological loss at all from the tax payment.148 In other words, if a
taxpayer’s reference point is her net pay, then the taxes do not represent
a psychological loss at all.
On the other hand, it may be more difficult for taxpayers not subject
to withholding to avoid experiencing a psychological loss from paying
taxes. Paying taxes quarterly out of the taxpayer’s own funds is more
likely to evoke the endowment effect and make the experience painful.
However, whether a taxpayer experiences a loss from direct remittance
may depend on whether the taxpayer has kept a mental account for
taxes.
The idea of mental accounting, famously described by economist
Richard Thaler, is that we tend to separate our resources into different
“accounts” in our minds that serve different purposes, such as savings,
spending money, and money that is earmarked for certain purchases.149
Mental accounting explains why, for example, a person might spend an
unexpected cash gift of $1,000 on a vacation but spend an annual salary
increase of $1,000 on household bills.
Mental accounting may allow people to shift their reference points for
purposes of determining gain and loss.150 For example, if a person
anticipates a $500 bill is due, but has mentally budgeted for that amount
in advance, payment of the bill may not feel like a psychological loss at
all. This may be because the person has shifted their reference point
from zero to a $500 loss, in which case the payment of $500 is a nonevent.
Similarly, taxpayers who are not subject to withholding may keep
mental accounts for taxes, such that their reference point is set at a
147 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342-46 (1990).
148 Cf. Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 848-49 (discussing the possible impact the
endowment effect may have on labor supply when workers do not have taxes withheld).
149 See Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI.
199, 199-201 (1985).
150 See Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42
J. MARKETING RES. 119, 127 (2005) (“Budgeting intentions distinguish between withinbudget expenditures, which are not treated as losses, and extrabudget expenditures,
which evoke loss aversion.”).
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certain amount of tax liability (rather than zero). For example, a selfemployed taxpayer may believe she likely owes $10,000 of tax to the
IRS in a particular year. Each quarter, she knows she must set aside
$2,500 for estimated taxes. If she has mentally budgeted that $2,500 of
her income will go to a mental “tax account,” the payments may not feel
like a loss. Instead her reference point would be $2,500 each quarter. In
that case, owing additional tax with her tax return might evoke a loss,
but it would be a loss measured against a $10,000 reference point, not
zero. For example, owing an additional $2,000 ($12,000 of tax liability
total) at year-end would feel like a $2,000 loss, not a $12,000 loss.
Evidence on whether taxpayers successfully keep these kinds of
mental accounts is mixed. One study that interviewed self-employed
taxpayers found that “some taxpayers seem to keep a separate mental
tax account to put aside money for their tax due. Others tend to
integrate taxes and other costs and revenues, resulting in the feeling of
ownership for the whole gross income . . . .”151 A later study found that
taxpayers’ tendency to segregate taxes into separate mental accounts
was positively correlated with age and experience.152 Those that tended
to mentally budget for taxes were, unsurprisingly, more likely to report
honestly, had more positive views about paying taxes, and were less
likely to experience liquidity problems.153
In sum, even though it is certainly possible for taxpayers to mentally
account for taxes in a way that makes direct remittance as painless as
withholding, empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers do not
do this. Rather, it appears many people experience a psychological loss
in connection with tax payments, either because they do not mentally
account for taxes or because they do so incorrectly. This is more likely
to be the case with an inexperienced taxpayer who is not able to
adequately predict her tax liability. On the other hand, taxpayers subject
to withholding do not have to keep mental accounts for taxes, because
they are unlikely to have to make any tax payments from their own
funds.

151 Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, Mental Accounting of Self-Employed
Taxpayers: On the Mental Segregation of the Net Income and the Tax Due, 69
FINANZARCHIV 412, 433 (2013).
152 Stephan Muehlbacher, Barbara Hartl & Erich Kirchler, Mental Accounting and Tax
Compliance: Experimental Evidence for the Effect of Mental Segregation of Tax Due and
Revenue on Compliance, 45 PUB. FIN. REV. 118, 135 (2017). The earlier study also found
a positive correlation with age. See Muehlbacher & Kirchler, supra note 151, at 429.
153 See id. at 134-35.
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Salience

Yet another feature of withholding is that it makes taxes less salient
to taxpayers, which may influence behavior or perceptions of the tax
system. Salience in this context generally refers to the visibility of a
tax.154 In general, the more salient a tax, the more taxpayers will react.
In a seminal study of tax salience, researchers found that when sales
taxes were included in the posted purchase price of an item at a store
(i.e., the tax was highly salient), people were less likely to buy the
item.155 On the other hand, when taxes were not included on the price
tag but instead only showed up at the register (i.e., lower salience), the
tax had significantly less impact on purchase decisions.156 Interestingly,
people tended to ignore sales taxes when they were not included in the
posted price even though surveyed consumers generally had knowledge
about sales tax rates.157
Paying estimated taxes is highly salient; the cost is visible because
taxpayers must remit the tax directly. In contrast, wage withholding
may function somewhat like sales taxes that are imposed at the register
only, i.e., they may have low salience. Although an employee has access
to gross wage and tax information on her paystub, not having to make
a tax payment reduces the salience of the tax.158 This is particularly true
for taxpayers who receive direct deposits of their earnings, who may not
even look at their paystubs on a regular basis. This lower salience may
reduce the pain associated with paying taxes and/or promote more
positive attitudes about paying taxes.159

154 See Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1146 n.2 (2009); David Gamage & Darien Shanske,
Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19,
23 (2011) (“‘[T]ax salience’ refers to the extent to which taxpayers account for the costs
imposed by taxation when the taxpayers make decisions or judgments.”).
155 See Chetty, Looney & Kroft, supra note 154, at 1146 (finding that purchases
declined by about 8 percent when the tax was included in the price tag).
156 See id.
157 See id. at 1147.
158 Gamage and Shanske note that there are several possible explanations for why
withholding might reduce salience. Besides allowing taxes to be paid before taxpayers
receive their paychecks, they point out that withholding also breaks up large tax
payments into regular, smaller payments, which may also reduce salience. See Gamage
& Shanske, supra note 154, at 41-42.
159 Some commentators have argued that this lower salience is a negative attribute
of withholding. See infra Part IV.

2019]

The Modern Case for Withholding

115

B. Withholding as a Mechanism for Overpayment
There are many aspects of tax withholding that align with individuals’
preferences for how they like to pay debts. Part A above described
preferences to pay debts early, make multiple small payments, and
minimize variation in payments. Additionally, withholding reduces the
salience of taxes and likely helps taxpayers mentally account for taxes
in a way that minimizes the psychological loss. All of these features of
tax withholding apply regardless of whether a taxpayer claims a refund.
As long as a taxpayer does not owe a significant balance with her return,
withholding likely makes paying taxes less painful compared to direct
remittance.
Additionally, and separately from these aforementioned features of
withholding, paying taxes through withholding often results in an
overpayment, which is returned to the taxpayer through a tax refund.
Indeed, most taxpayers in the United States claim refunds when they
file their tax return.160 Empirical studies indicate this, too, appears to
align with taxpayer preferences. And although taxpayers who remit
taxes directly could also overpay and claim a refund, there is no default
mechanism in place that ensures this happens and it is likely harder and
less common for taxpayers to do so.
The preference to overpay taxes and claim a refund is consistent with
what Thaler calls the “silver lining” effect, i.e., the preference to
accompany a loss with a small silver lining. Recent empirical research
has shown that consumers do, in fact, often prefer to overpay debts and
have the overpayment refunded to them. Additionally, a number of
studies have examined the preference for overpayments specifically in
the context of tax withholding. The subsections below describe those
studies and explore additional explanations for why taxpayers may
prefer refunds.
1.

The Silver Lining Effect

Studies show that many people prefer paying a larger total amount
accompanied by a small refund, compared to paying slightly less and
receiving no refund. Economist Richard Thaler described this
phenomenon as the “silver lining” principle.161 In other words, losses
are easier to cope with if accompanied by a small silver lining.

160 See Thomas, supra note 34, at 115 n.33 (finding that nearly 80 percent of
taxpayers overall and over 90 percent of wage earners claim a refund).
161 Thaler, supra note 149, at 202.
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An empirical study of the silver lining effect showed that, indeed,
when presented with hypothetical gambles, subjects preferred a small
gain paired with a larger loss (e.g., a loss of $60 paired with a gain of
$5) as opposed to an equivalent loss with no gain (e.g., a loss of $55).162
Subjects were more likely to prefer segregation of a loss with a gain if
the loss was large and the gain was small.163
A more recent study examined the phenomenon in the context of
advanced payments for utilities in Germany.164 Germany requires utility
customers to make monthly, fixed advanced payments for utilities based
on the utility company’s estimate of their annual consumption.165 At the
end of the year, customers either receive a refund for any amount
overpaid or a bill for the remaining balance due.166 Because the utility
company cannot make perfectly accurate predictions about usage,
roughly half of customers overpay and half underpay.167
The authors of the study surveyed utility consumers to gauge their
preferences for underpayments versus overpayments. First, they found
that, when presented with hypothetical options about refund and
payment scenarios, most consumers preferred to overpay and receive a
refund versus owing a balance.168 The more uncertain their utility
consumption was ahead of time, the stronger the preference was to
overpay and claim a refund.169 Participants even preferred refunds when
the refund scenario had a higher total bill than the balance due scenario;
in other words, they were willing to pay slightly more overall to have a
refund.170
Second, the study found that utility users who had received refunds
were more likely to recommend their utility provider as compared to
those who owed a balance, indicating higher satisfaction among those

162 See Peter Jarnebrant, Olivier Toubia & Eric Johnson, The Silver Lining Effect:
Formal Analysis and Experiments, 55 MGMT. SCI. 1832, 1838-39 (2009).
163 See id. at 1839.
164 See Fabian Schulz, Christian Schlereth, Nina Mazar & Bernd Skiera, Advance
Payment Systems: Paying Too Much Today and Being Satisfied Tomorrow, 32 INT’L J. RES.
MARKETING 238, 238-39 (2015).
165 Id. at 238.
166 Id.
167 Although the study’s authors did not analyze the entire universe of consumers,
in a sample of over 700, approximately half (381) received refunds and half (398) owed
a balance. Id. at 245. Customers generally do not have a zero balance because the utility
company’s predictions are never perfectly accurate. See id.
168 Id. at 243.
169 Id. at 243-44.
170 Id. at 243.
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who received refunds.171 Finally, those with refunds were less likely to
switch utility companies as compared to those who owed a balance,
again indicating an overall preference for refunds.172
In sum, multiple studies indicate that people prefer a larger payment
accompanied by a refund, as compared to a slightly smaller payment
and no refund. The preference is so strong that, in some cases, people
are even willing to pay a premium (i.e., to pay more overall) for that
refund. One potential explanation is Thaler’s notion of the silver lining
effect. In the case of taxpayers, there are several additional explanations
for why they might prefer refunds, as well. A preference for refunds may
be a reaction to uncertainty about taxes owed, or taxpayers may view
refunds as a commitment device that helps them save. Or, as one
commentator has suggested,173 the prevalence of refunds may not reflect
preferences at all, but rather may just be a default effect of the IRS
withholding tables. The following section reviews studies on
overwithholding and examines potential explanations offered by
scholars for why the phenomenon is so frequently observed.
2.

Evidence of Taxpayer Preferences for Overwithholding

One possible reason that taxpayers may prefer to overwithhold during
the year is that they are uncertain what their final tax liability will be
and they prefer to err on the side of caution.174 This is not necessarily
an irrational response, given that taxpayers may face a penalty for
under-withholding.175
Taxpayers who are subject to withholding, but who withhold too
little during the year and owe a significant balance with their tax return,
face the same estimated tax penalties that those not subject to
withholding do. Specifically, taxpayers who do not prepay either (1) 90
percent of their current year’s tax liability or (2) 100 percent of their

171 See id. at 247. Customers who had claimed refunds also demonstrated lower
awareness about prices, which is linked to higher customer satisfaction. See id. at 247.
Customers tend to be more aware of prices when they are unsatisfied and are searching
for alternatives. See id. at 244.
172 The final part of the study looked at actual churn rates among consumers who
had received refunds and those who had made payments and found those who had
received refunds were less likely to switch companies. Id. at 248.
173 Damon Jones, Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the Prevalence of Income Tax
Refunds, 4 AM. ECON. J. 158, 160 (2012).
174 See, e.g., Jannett Highfill, Douglas Thorson & William V. Weber, Tax
Overwithholding as a Response to Uncertainty, 26 PUB. FIN. REV. 376, 376 (1998).
175 Id. at 387-88.
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prior year’s tax liability may be subject to an estimated tax penalty.176
The penalty is a fixed percentage of the tax due, generally calculated as
the “federal short-term rate” (which tracks current interest rates177) plus
3 percent.178 For example, in April 2018, the federal short-term rate was
approximately 2 percent, making the penalty rate for failure to pay
estimated tax 5 percent of the unpaid tax.179
On the other hand, the upside for the taxpayer for delaying payment
of her tax, i.e., the interest she can earn on those funds, is often lower.180
In April of 2018, the yield on a 6-month Treasury bill was not quite 2
percent.181 This means that, if a taxpayer set aside $1,000 to invest
instead of paying it to the IRS, she might earn interest of about $20 pretax and something short of that after tax.182 But, she would owe the
government 5 percent — or $50 — for paying it late, which would be
176 I.R.C. § 6654(d) (2018). However, there is no penalty if the tax owed with the
return is less than $1000 or if the individual had no tax liability the previous year.
§ 6654(e)(1)-(2).
177 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES &
GIFTS ¶ 116.2 n.11 (2019).
178 § 6654(a) (referring to the underpayment rate set by I.R.C. § 6621). Section 6621
sets the underpayment rate at 3 percent plus the “federal short-term rate” as determined
by the IRS. § 6621(a)-(b). The rate is higher for large corporations. § 6621(c).
179 See Rev. Rul. 2018-07, 2018-13 I.R.B. 445 (Mar. 26, 2018); see also I.R.S. News
Release IR-2018-43 (Mar. 7, 2018).
180 But some taxpayers’ foregone opportunity cost may be higher than the Treasury
rate because the funds could have been used to pay off high-interest debt. See Donna D.
Bobek, Richard C. Hatfield & Kristin Wentzel, An Investigation of Why Taxpayers Prefer
Refunds: A Theory of Planned Behavior Approach, 29 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 93, 94 (2007).
For example, a taxpayer who owes credit card debt bearing 20 percent interest may be
better off (economically) by paying the debt sooner and incurring tax penalties for late
tax payments. See id. Another possible cost to overpaying taxes, in addition to foregone
interest, is that “tax professionals may charge more for tax returns resulting in refunds.”
Id. at 95.
181 See
Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interestrates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yieldYear&year=2018 (last visited July 11, 2019)
(listing the daily yield for 6-month Treasury bond rate at 1.92 percent for April 2, 2018).
182 Although taxpayers can make tax-favored investments (e.g., a 401(k) or an IRA
account), generally these investments cannot be made on a short-term basis. See, e.g.,
401(k) Resource Guide - Plan Participants - General Distribution Rules, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/401k-resourceguide-plan-participants-general-distribution-rules (last visited Oct. 1, 2019) (describing
conditions for distributions from a 401(k) plan and penalties for early distributions).
Taxpayers may also make riskier investments (e.g., a stock purchase) that yield a higher
return than Treasury bills; however, this is likely more difficult to do on a short-term basis,
as well. See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity
Premium Puzzle, 110 Q.J. ECON. 73, 83-84 (1995) (showing stock portfolios outperform
bonds over the long term but not on a short-term basis).
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nondeductible for tax purposes. Because the penalty on tax
underpayments is keyed off of short-term interest rates plus 3 percent,
the penalty is generally always going to be higher than the taxpayer’s
own rate of return if she invests the funds on a short-term basis. Given
the disparity among these rates of return, and the inevitable uncertainty
about how much tax will be due for many taxpayers, some scholars have
suggested the choice to overwithhold is perfectly rational.183
In reality, the choice to overwithhold to avoid penalties depends more
on taxpayers’ perceptions about those penalties than on the actual rate
of the penalty. Taxpayers may perceive penalties to be harsher than they
are and withhold more accordingly. Aside from their perceptions about
economic costs, taxpayers may also experience a psychological cost to
owing underpayment penalties, which may encourage them to
overwithhold. The psychological cost may arise from the fear of being
subject to a penalty or fear of interactions with the IRS in general.184 It
may also simply be a psychological cost from owing an additional
payment at all with the tax return, which would be consistent with the
concept of debt aversion discussed above.185
Other scholars have suggested that so many people overpay their
taxes during the year because IRS withholding tables generally default
to overwithholding, and transaction costs for overcoming such defaults

183 See Highfill et al., supra note 174, at 390. Highfill, Thorson, and Weber model a
taxpayer’s decision to overwithhold under uncertainty and find that, given that the
“penalty for underwithholding exceeds the opportunity cost of withholding, it is
optimal for taxpayers to overwithhold.” Id. at 376. The authors conclude that their
model “substantially explain[s]” the rate of overwithholding in the United States. Id.
However, a subsequent critique of their paper finds that “penalty avoidance” explains
only a fraction of overwithholding rates in the United States, and that other factors must
also influence the propensity of taxpayers to claim refunds. See Ashvin Gandhi &
Michael Kuehlwein, Reexamining Income Tax Overwithholding as a Response to
Uncertainty, 44 PUB. FIN. REV. 220, 222 (2016). Notably, Gandhi and Kuehlwein point
out that Highfill, Thorson, and Weber fail to account for the fact that taxpayers who
face estimated tax penalties could also invest their funds and earn interest before paying
the penalty. See id. at 228-30. Thus, the effective cost of the penalty is not the penalty
itself, but the penalty minus the taxpayer’s (after-tax) rate of return. In the example
above in the text, a taxpayer facing a $50 estimated tax penalty on $1,000 of tax would
be able to offset that with her earnings from investing the $1,000. However, these
earnings would likely be subject to tax. Assuming a 20 percent tax rate, a taxpayer might
net $16 ($20 minus $4 in tax) on her $1,000 short-term investment. This makes her
effective penalty $34 ($50 minus $16), rather than $50, which still exceeds her rate of
return on the investment.
184 Cf. Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 56 B.C. L. REV.
617 (2015) (describing various psychological costs of tax evasion).
185 See supra Part III.
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may be high.186 A taxpayer who wants to change her withholding must
fill out a new Form W-4 for her employer, which may be confusing and
will require time and effort. One study of IRS data found that taxpayers
generally do not bother to change their default withholding even when
their circumstances change, which appears to suggest that either
economic or psychological costs may be a barrier.187
The fact that overwithholding is a default for many taxpayers188
suggests that at least some people may not prefer it, but instead simply
perceive the transaction costs to be too high to opt out. But other
research indicates that overwithholding is still preferable for many
people, regardless of defaults and transaction costs. For example, one
empirical study presented participants with a hypothetical scenario
involving a taxpayer expecting a $1,500 year-end refund.189 The
hypothetical taxpayer was given the option, mid-year, to reduce his tax
withholding by $250 per month in lieu of receiving a refund.190 The
study participants were told the taxpayer would have to go to his
employer and adjust his Form W-4 to do so.191 The participants were
then asked how likely they would be to adjust their withholding if they
were in the shoes of the hypothetical taxpayer, and were also asked
multiple questions about the reason underlying their (hypothetical)
withholding decision.192
On average, the survey participants indicated that they would be
unlikely to adjust their withholding, and that they would rather receive
a refund.193 This is consistent with the study describing withholding as
a default effect. However, the two most prominent explanations for the
respondents’ desire to keep their refund were: (1) that they would enjoy
a refund more than extra monthly income, and (2) that the refund
186 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Ayres, Steven J. Kachelmeier & John R. Robinson, Why Do
People Give Interest-Free Loans to the Government? An Experimental Study of Interim Tax
Payments, 21 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 55, 56 (1999) (“Even if taxpayers understand the rules,
an individual taxpayer’s time value of money for interim tax remittances may not exceed
transaction costs. For example, the process of fine-tuning IRS Form W-4 to override
default withholding rules is cumbersome and inconvenient.”); see also Bobek et al.,
supra note 180, at 94.
187 See Jones, supra note 173, at 159.
188 The IRS withholding tables are designed to intentionally overwithhold tax. See
Thomas, supra note 34, at 142, n.180.
189 See Bobek et al., supra note 180, at 100.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 109. Overall, 67 percent of respondents indicated that they would not
reduce their refund. Id.
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would reduce the uncertainty about owing tax at the end of the year.194
As to the latter point, the respondents generally indicated concern about
owing an unexpected sum of money at the end of the year and not
having sufficient funds to pay it.195 On the other hand, subjects did not
appear to view the time or effort involved in changing the Form W-4 to
be a major contributing factor to their decision.196
In terms of why respondents would enjoy getting a refund, the
authors of the study asked participants how they would spend the
$1,500 refund versus how they would spend the extra $250/month from
the withholding adjustment.197 People were most likely to spend a
refund on a vacation, whereas people were most likely to spend extra
monthly income on paying bills,198 which is consistent with the concept
of mental accounting discussed above.199 The authors concluded that
the tendency to spend a refund on more enjoyable consumption items
likely contributes to positive views about refunds in general.200
Another study surveyed participants to examine tax payment
preferences in both withholding and direct remittance systems.201
Subjects were assigned to either a withholding (employee) scenario or
a quarterly estimated taxes (independent contractor) scenario. They
were then told a certain amount of tax — $16,000 — would be due, and
that they could choose to pay that exact amount, more, or less during
the year.202 Subjects were also told that the minimum amount of
advanced tax payments that had to be made to avoid a penalty was
$12,000.203 In other words, subjects could withhold or pay quarterly
estimated taxes equal to their entire tax bill and owe nothing at year194

See id. at 99.
See id.
196 See id. at 106.
197 See id. at 107.
198 Id. Spending money on vacation was ranked highest for how people would use
the $1,500 refund (53.6 percent) and lowest for how people would use $250 of
additional monthly earnings (19.3 percent). Id. On the other hand, paying off bills was
ranked the highest for the use of additional monthly earnings (50 percent) and lowest
for use of a refund (32.9 percent). Id.
199 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
200 See Bobek et al., supra note 180, at 108 (“These results suggest that many
taxpayers ‘enjoy’ getting a refund because of what they spend it on.”).
201 See Ayres et al., supra note 186, at 55.
202 Id. at 63. Within the two scenarios, participants were further separated into
“relative certainty” and “relative uncertainty” conditions. Id. at 62. The latter introduced
uncertainty as to the total amount of tax due, but not as to the minimum amount due
to avoid a penalty. Id. Unsurprisingly, subjects opted to prepay significantly more tax
in the uncertainty conditions as compared to the certainty conditions. Id. at 65, 72.
203 See id. at 64.
195
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end, or they could pay only $12,000 on an advanced basis and owe
$4,000 at year-end, but with no penalty. The study’s authors
intentionally designed this question to remove the confusion that may
influence tax payment behavior in the real world, and to remove the
transaction costs (e.g., the hassle of making withholding elections).204
Notwithstanding these diminished obstacles,205 nearly half (43
percent) of subjects still chose to pay the entire tax liability and not
retain a portion until the end of the year.206 In other words, even though
they knew they would not be penalized, a substantial portion of the
participants did not want to owe any money to the IRS at the end of the
year. The authors concluded that factors other than transaction costs
and confusion must drive preferences to pay more than the minimum
amount of tax due to avoid a penalty.207
Interestingly, preferences were not significantly different between the
withholding group and the estimated taxes group; both generally
preferred not to owe significant additional tax at year-end.208 The
authors concluded that in both the case of withholding or estimated
taxes, “the taxpayer who remits taxes at the minimum today faces the
unappealing prospect of anticipating a delayed payment of tax due
later.”209 Further survey questions revealed that subjects were
concerned about lacking liquid funds to pay a large year-end balance,
and that some did not trust themselves to invest the extra funds in an
interest-bearing account.210
That nearly half of participants preferred not owing money at the end
of the year is revealing, because the study intentionally removed
transaction costs and the element of uncertainty associated with not
knowing how much tax would be owed.211 Many taxpayers appear to
have a significant aversion to owing a balance with their tax return, even
if they can predict what that balance will be. In reality, taxpayers face
204 See id. at 62. In addition to removing these factors, the authors noted that the
study participants (MBA students) were educated and familiar with time value of money
principles. See id.
205 Confusion was eliminated by specifying the amount due to avoid a penalty;
however, the total tax due was uncertain in some conditions. See id. (explaining the
uncertainties introduced to participants in the study).
206 Ayres et al., supra note 186, at 64.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 67 (finding that “the form of outlay did not significantly affect
preferences”).
209 Id. at 68. The authors also noted that the propensity to overpay decreases as
taxpaying experience increases. Id.
210 See id. at 66-67.
211 See id. at 56.
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both transaction costs to change their withholding elections and
uncertainty. This indicates that in the real world, preferences for
overwithholding are likely even higher than the percentage in the study.
And since it is nearly impossible for taxpayers to predict their final tax
liability with complete certainty, we can expect many will want to err
on the side of overpayment versus underpayment. This is supported by
the study on overpayments for utility usage,212 in which participants
who did not know what their year-end bill would be preferred to err on
the side of overpayment.
Finally, some studies indicate that taxpayers may prefer
overwithholding because they view a tax refund as a form of forced
savings plan. Taxpayers who otherwise wish to save may lack the selfcontrol to do so during the year, and overwithholding allows additional
money to be kept out of their reach until they receive their refund,
which may help fund the purchase of a durable good like a car or
appliance.213
The overall effect of withholding on consumption and savings is
unclear, and likely depends, in part, on how taxpayers mentally account
for tax refunds. Several studies have examined how taxpayers treat
annual lump sum refund payments versus smaller interim payments.
The general takeaway is that people appear more likely to spend smaller
interim payments and more likely to save a lump sum refund, although
savings may take the form of purchasing a durable good.214 For
example, one such study found that when a $300-$600 tax refund was
paid out monthly over the course of a year, the refund was more likely
to be spent on monthly expenses instead of saved.215
Another study examined a 1992 stimulus, which reduced taxpayers’
withholding to produce larger paychecks, which in turned produced
212

See supra notes 164-172 and accompanying text.
See Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 138, at 401. See generally Michael S. Barr & Jane
K. Dokko, Paying to Save: Tax Withholding and Asset Allocation Among Low- and
Moderate-Income Taxpayers (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series,
Working Paper No. 2008-11, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/
200811/200811pap.pdf (examining taxpayer preferences for overwithholding and
concluding that withholding operates in part as a self-control device for lower income
taxpayers to help them save).
214 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Romich & Thomas Weisner, How Families View and Use the
EITC: Advance Payment Versus Lump Sum Delivery, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1245, 1258-59
(2000) (discussing refunds as a forced savings mechanism among EITC recipients).
215 See Valrie Chambers & Marilyn Spencer, Does Changing the Timing of a Yearly
Individual Tax Refund Change the Amount Spent vs. Saved?, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 856,
861-62 (2008). This was true for smaller refunds ($300 to $600). See id. at 860. Larger
refunds ($3,000 to $6,000) were more likely to be saved regardless of how they were
paid. See id.
213
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smaller year-end tax refunds. The study found that reducing the lump
sum refund in this manner resulted in lower savings in IRAs as
compared to when refunds were larger.216 But another study found that
taxpayers were more likely to spend federal stimulus payments on
consumption when paid as a larger lump sum as compared to small
additions to each paycheck,217 indicating that refunds may encourage
consumption rather than savings.
Regardless of whether overwithholding results in more spending or
more savings, taxpayers may prefer it because of how they mentally
account for refunds. As commentators have suggested, it may be that
overwithholding helps taxpayers save up funds to purchase important
consumer durables.218 Or, taxpayers may view refunds as a windfall that
they feel more comfortable spending on a leisure purchase, like
vacation.219
In sum, numerous studies indicate that taxpayers prefer receiving
refunds, even though they do not earn interest on refunds. This
preference is likely due to a multitude of factors such as debt aversion,
uncertainty, and perhaps a desire to save. Withholding helps put most
taxpayers in a refund position because the withholding tables generally
default to overpayment. In contrast, it may be harder for taxpayers not
subject to withholding to overpay their taxes during the year, either
because they have difficulty estimating what is due, or because they lack
the self-control to make overpayments to the IRS. It is likely particularly
difficult for those paying estimated taxes to make overpayments because
those overpayments are likely to be made in larger sums (due only
quarterly) and are thus more salient and painful than small additional
amounts being withheld from each paycheck. Thus, while withholding
is not a prerequisite for receiving a tax refund, taxpayers are probably
more likely to overpay and claim a refund if they are subject to
withholding.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Parts II and III reexamined the benefits of withholding from a
traditional economic perspective and a behavioral economics
216 See Naomi E. Feldman, Mental Accounting Effects of Income Tax Shifting, 92 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 70, 86 (2010).
217 See Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, Check in the Mail or
More in the Paycheck: Does the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus Depend on How It Is
Delivered?, 4 AM. ECON. J. 216, 217 (2012).
218 See Chambers & Spencer, supra note 215, at 861 (finding that consumers spend
10 percent of their refund, on average, on consumer durables).
219 See Bobek, supra note 180, at 108.
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perspective. From a pure cost-benefit standpoint, withholding may be
the most efficient method for the government to collect taxes in many
circumstances, particularly in light of technological advances.
Additionally, for many individuals, withholding may enhance welfare
due to the psychological pain of making infrequent, lump sum tax
payments. Accordingly, this Part begins by revisiting the historic
objections to withholding and argues that many of those objections are
now obsolete.
This Part then considers specific policy implications. Part IV.B argues
that withholding should be expanded beyond employment, offers
guiding principles for doing so, and identifies particular settings where
withholding would be particularly beneficial. Part IV.C then proposes
that “quasi-withholding” be implemented when regular withholding is
not feasible. As discussed further below, quasi-withholding would
utilize private third parties to facilitate tax payments from the taxpayer
to the government in a manner that replicates many of the psychological
benefits of withholding.
A. Revisiting Objections
Many of the objections to withholding discussed in Part I are less
relevant today than they were several decades ago. Payers can withhold
at a lower cost than ever before with the use of payroll software, and the
IRS can often avoid processing refund checks through the mail through
the use of electronic direct deposit. Further, due to the expansion of the
gig economy in the last decade (discussed further below), there is a
growing number of arrangements where large payees compensate many
smaller non-employee workers. Additionally, a plethora of recent
empirical research demonstrates why taxpayers tend to prefer
withholding.
However, not all of the arguments raised by Doernberg and other
commentators are addressed by these developments, and some serious
objections to withholding remain. Doernberg’s argument that
withholding violates the annual accounting principle is not without
merit.220 However, this objection relates to paying taxes in advance, not
to withholding specifically. A system of estimated tax payments, in
which a taxpayer unwittingly overpays in the beginning of the year, has
the same flaw in that the taxpayer cannot obtain a refund of her
overpayment until she files her tax return the following year. These
concerns are outweighed by the government’s need to ensure a timely

220

See Doernberg, supra note 8, at 622-23.
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revenue stream, which is why we currently require quarterly payments
in the absence of withholding.
It is also true, as Doernberg notes, that taxpayers do not earn interest
on their refunds, which imposes additional costs.221 It is unclear,
though, how this interest cost balances against the psychological costs
of owing money and fearing penalties. Empirical studies indicate that,
in other settings, individuals are willing to forego interest in order to
avoid owing money. If lack of interest were a serious concern, Congress
could always require that taxpayers did earn interest on tax refunds.
The cost to the government may very well be worth the compliance
benefit of withholding. As to Doernberg’s argument that withholding
reduces savings, empirical studies indicate this is far from certain and
that, in fact, tax refunds produced by withholding may facilitate
savings.222
At least one serious object to withholding remains, however. Making
taxes less painful likely does cause people to pay less attention to them.
This could give too much taxing power to the government overall (as
Friedman feared), but it also may result in a less progressive tax system.
For example, one reason that Congress likely relies so heavily on payroll
taxes is that they are less salient than income tax rates. And even under
the proposals for expanding withholding discussed below, wealthy
individuals earning capital gains will continue to avoid withholding. At
the same time, increased withholding and quasi-withholding may
empower the government to further raise taxes on lower-income
taxpayers, and they may face fewer political obstacles.
In a worst-case scenario, expanded withholding would “numb” the
taxpaying public to the government’s tax policies and make the tax
system opaque and undemocratic.223 There is good reason, however, to
doubt this end result would come to pass if we expanded withholding
and/or quasi-withholding. First, making taxes salient and
psychologically painful is not equivalent to transparency. Just because
taxpayers do not pay attention to taxes, does not mean that they cannot
easily discover what rules apply to them.224 Withholding does nothing
to mask the substantive tax rules, such as rates or what sources of
income are subject to tax. Withholding makes it easier for taxpayers to
221

See id. at 606.
See generally supra notes 213-214 and accompanying text (discussing
withholdings as a forced savings mechanism).
223 Goldberg, supra note 48.
224 See Schenk, supra note 145, at 285 (“The argument for using low-salience taxes
is that they make raising revenue palatable to the citizenry — not that the citizenry
should be tricked.”).
222
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choose not to confront the tax rules that apply to them, but does not
necessarily make those rules harder to find or understand.
Second, there is little evidence that making individual taxes more
painful would result in better tax policies for individual taxpayers.
While Congress continues to rely on low salience mechanisms to
impose taxes on individuals,225 the dominant reforms in the recent Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 applied to businesses and were no doubt
motivated by political pressure from the business sector.226 Like many
other areas of the law, the tax law has a long history of catering to
corporations and special interest groups, often at the expense of
individuals.227 So while making taxes more painful may stir more anger
and resentment among individual taxpayers, it is unclear whether
increased anger would produce more favorable tax rules.
On the other hand, much good could come from “numbing” the pain
of paying taxes, and such good might outweigh transparency concerns.
By eliminating burdensome compliance requirements for taxpayers,
withholding would reduce wasteful social costs imposed by the current
system. Withholding would also likely reduce taxpayer’s negative
perceptions about the tax system in general, particularly its complexity.
Positive attitudes towards the system might, in turn, spill over to higher
compliance overall, resulting in more tax revenue for the government
and a fairer tax system.

225 For example, the 2017 tax reform bill reduced individual income tax rates until
2026, but Congress also switched the method by which tax brackets are adjusted for
inflation. The new, faster inflation adjustment will bump taxpayers into higher tax
brackets sooner than they would have under the old method, which amounts to a
(stealthy) tax increase. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11002,
131 Stat. 2054 (2017); see also Howard Gleckman, The Hidden Tax Increase in the Big
Six Tax Outline, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
taxvox/hidden-tax-increase-big-six-tax-outline.
226 For example, while tax rate cuts to individuals are temporary (expiring in 2026),
the corporate tax rate reduction (from 35 percent to 21 percent) is permanent, as are
changes to the international corporate tax regime. See Preliminary Details and Analysis
of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/
final-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-details-analysis/.
227 For a description of how special interest groups successfully lobbied to obtain
favorable treatment under the newly enacted pass-through deduction (section 199A of
the Code), see Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and Comment: The Making of the
§ 199A Regulations, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3277672.
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B. Expanding Withholding: Where and How
This Section argues that withholding should be expanded to other
sources of income besides wages. It first discusses the general
circumstances in which withholding is beneficial and proposes basing
non-employee withholding obligations on the economic profile of the
payer.228 Specifically, withholding could be required any time a payer of
a certain size (based on income) makes a business-related payment to
an individual payee. It then identifies specific scenarios — for example,
gig economy workers — where withholding could be expanded.
1.

General Principles

Recall that the cost of withholding by larger payers is often smaller
than the cost of individual payees remitting their own taxes because the
payer will have declining marginal costs for each additional worker.
Thus, a scenario that involves a single payer transacting with multiple
payees is likely a good candidate for withholding from a cost-benefit
perspective. Further, a payer that pays multiple individuals is more
likely to have invested in payroll software, which makes withholding
cheaper as well. Payers with more financial resources may also be more
likely to invest in payroll software regardless of how many payees they
have.
The converse is also true. When a payer transacts with a single payee,
particularly one of equal size and sophistication, there are less likely to
be compliance cost savings through withholding. Consider, for
example, a scenario where a homeowner pays a contractor to build her
a fence. If the homeowner does not otherwise have employees, she likely
does not have software in place already to handle payroll and
withholding obligations. If a withholding obligation were imposed on
the homeowner with respect to the contractor’s taxes, her costs for
withholding and making quarterly remittances would likely be at least
as much as the costs of having the contractor remit taxes directly.
Further, having to transfer tax information from the contractor to the
homeowner would likely make withholding slightly more expensive if
228 There is an argument that all withholding should be conditioned on the size of
the payer, which would reduce the importance of the employer/independent contractor
distinction. However, repealing the current withholding rules for employees would be
a much more radical change to the tax law than simply expanding withholding to
include some non-employees. It would also take withholding away from some
employees (like household employees or employees of very small businesses) who
currently enjoy it. Thus, this Article does not advocate for such a change but rather
suggests leaving the current employee withholding rules in place.
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their compliance costs were otherwise equal. The IRS would also not
save audit and other enforcement costs from having the homeowner
remit taxes instead of the contactor.
Withholding in the homeowner-contractor scenario is also less likely
to reduce tax evasion. Although a framing benefit would exist if the
contractor were overwithheld, there is more likelihood of collusion in
this scenario. If the homeowner’s payment is a nondeductible personal
expense, she has little personal incentive to report it (other than fear of
penalties).229 The contractor, of course, has an incentive to have the
homeowner not report the payment to the IRS. The two might thus
agree that the contractor will charge slightly less to build the fence in
return for the homeowner not reporting the payment.
In sum, withholding is most likely to be beneficial when payers:
(1) have more financial resources; (2) transact with multiple payees;
and (3) make payments in a business, rather than personal, capacity.
Which payees benefit most from withholding? Lower-income payees
are the most likely to experience budgeting and liquidity issues that
often make it hard to pay taxes in the absence of withholding.230 These
taxpayers are more likely to have trouble paying estimated tax penalties,
as well, even if those penalties are small. Younger and less-experienced
taxpayers are also more likely to have difficulty dealing with estimated
taxes, although this likely dissipates with age and experience.231
Empirical research indicates that taxpayers with unpredictable
income streams are more likely to prefer withholding, as well. There is
an irony here, because the taxpayers with the most predictable income
— salaried employees — pay taxes through withholding while
independent contractors with less steady income streams do not. But
there is an administrative explanation for this: it is far easier to develop
and administer a withholding regime for taxpayers who have
predictable income.232 Yet those with variable income are the taxpayers
for whom making estimated tax payments is particularly painful,
because uncertainty appears to have a high psychological cost.233

229 In contrast, an employer has an incentive to report wage payments because wages
are deductible business expenses. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2018). Thus, collusion is less
likely. See Lederman, supra note 78, at 729-30.
230 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 5, at 1437.
231 For example, empirical research shows that older and more experienced
taxpayers are more likely to keep separate mental accounts for taxes. See Muehlbacher
et al., supra note 152, at 135.
232 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1446.
233 See generally Bobek et al., supra note 180, at 109 (describing the potential
emotional benefits arising from overpaying).
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Numerous studies indicate that taxpayers fear owing large balances to
the IRS that they potentially cannot pay, and prefer to overpay, even at
a premium, as opposed to having an uncertain liability. On the other
hand, workers with steady income streams who can predict their tax
liability can likely manage estimated tax payments more easily.
In sum, withholding is most likely to be beneficial when payees:
(1) have fewer financial resources; (2) are less financially savvy; and
(3) have unpredictable income streams. As discussed further below, this
makes withholding particularly attractive for gig economy workers and
other low-income independent contractors.
2.

Base Withholding Requirements on Profile of the Payer

With the above principles in mind, policymakers should condition
non-employee withholding obligations on the profile of the payer to
ensure that the withholding is most likely to be cost-effective. In brief,
withholding should be required whenever a business above a certain
size pays multiple individuals and when there is already an obligation
to issue a Form 1099.
First, outside of the context of employment, individual payers should
not be required to withhold when they make a payment in their
personal capacity. Rather, withholding obligations should be limited to
business-related payments only. Individuals making payments in their
personal capacity are less likely to have invested in payroll software and
are more likely to have to undertake expensive investments to manage
withholding obligations. Individuals also tend to make multiple, often
small, one-off payments for personal purposes. For example, it would
be burdensome and inefficient to require individuals to withhold taxes
every time they purchased an item for personal consumption such as a
meal or a household product.
Limiting withholding to payers who make payments in a business,
rather than personal, capacity is consistent with the rules for issuing
Form 1099s to independent contractors, which requires business
payments of $600 or more to be reported but not payments made in a
personal capacity.234 The same parameters, including the $600
threshold, should apply to withholding; keeping the withholding and
information reporting rules consistent reduces complexity and
compliance burdens. Further, in the same way that information
234 See 26 U.S.C. § 6041(a) (2019). Certain other limitations also apply; for example,
information reporting is not required for payments for goods or payments made to a
corporation. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2019 INSTRUCTIONS
FOR FORM 1099-MISC 7 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099msc.pdf.
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reporting is not required for payments to corporations, withholding
should be limited to payments made to individuals, rather than
corporations or other entities.235 Entities may have withholding
obligations of their own on the same transaction and, presumably,
individuals conducting business through an entity are better equipped
to manage tax obligations.236
Information reporting requirements are generally based on the type
of payment made, regardless of the economic profile of the payer. In the
case of withholding, however, policymakers should consider basing the
requirements on the size of the payer and the number of payees.
Withholding could be limited to those payers who have a minimum
dollar amount of gross business receipts, for example, $100,000. This
would ensure that very small businesses, for whom withholding might
be particularly costly, would not be required to withhold. Larger
businesses over a certain earnings threshold would have more resources
to handle withholding obligations, whether it be through software or a
payroll company.
Additionally, withholding obligations could be limited to only those
payers that make payments to a certain minimum number of payees.
For example, withholding could only be required of businesses making
taxable payments to at least 10 individuals during the tax year.237 This
would ensure that withholding requirements are imposed in situations
where payers are likely to have declining marginal costs, and avoided
where payers and payees might incur similar costs.
3.

Make Withholding Optional, But Make It the Default

Part III made the case that, for many taxpayers, withholding would
enhance welfare because of individuals’ preferences for small, advanced
payments and a general aversion to large lump-sum debts. However,
preferences are undoubtedly heterogeneous and some taxpayers may
prefer paying estimated taxes and deferring their obligations as long as
possible. They may rationally prefer to invest their funds and earn
interest, rather than extending an interest-free loan to the government.
Policymakers could take this heterogeneity into account by allowing

235

See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1444-45.
See id.
237 This would be relatively easy for the IRS to monitor by tracking Form 1099s; any
business (exceeding the earnings threshold) that issued at least 10 Forms 1099-MISC
or 1099-K would also be required to withhold.
236
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non-employee taxpayers the option to increase or reduce their rate of
withholding or opt out of withholding altogether.238
Although payees should have some freedom in determining the
extent of their withholding, policymakers should set default
withholding rates. Defaults could be determined in several ways. One
method would be to solicit information from the payee designed to
determine his marginal tax bracket, and then estimate his tax liability
on that basis.239 For example, the payee could check a box on a form
estimating his net income for the year based on a range of choices,
where each income range would correspond to a marginal income tax
bracket.240 The choice of income tax bracket would then help determine
the appropriate withholding rate. Another option, which would be less
accurate but simpler, would be to choose one, fixed default withholding
rate applicable to all payees.241
The default withholding rate could be based on: (1) an average
income tax rate that would apply to all payees; (2) the self-employment
tax rate (always 15.3 percent),242 and (3) a presumed percentage of each
gross payment that represents taxable net income. For example,
policymakers might presume that 40 percent of any gross business
payment represents net profit (meaning that 60 percent represents
deductible business expenses).243 They might further assume that the
average income tax rate for individuals engaged in a business is 15
percent. Self-employment taxes, which are the same rate for all
238 In theory, all taxpayers could be given the option to opt out of withholding.
However, it would be wise to limit this opt-out to non-employees for the time being.
First, employee withholding is well-established and has a good track record, so altering
that regime may be viewed as risky and politically unpopular. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text (99 percent compliance rate for employees). Second, there is a
stronger justification to give non-employees more flexibility when it comes to
withholding because they are at a significantly higher risk of being overwithheld. See
Thomas, supra note 5, at 1446 (observing that it is harder to calculate withholding
accurately for non-employees).
239 For a detailed discussion on how policymakers could estimate withholding rates
based on projected income, see Thomas, supra note 5, at 1447-50.
240 Such a form would be as simple as, or likely simpler than, the Form W-4 filled
out by employees. See id. at 1451.
241 For a proposal based on three possible rates, see Alastair Fitzpayne, Shelly
Steward & Ethan Pollack, Tax Simplification for Independent Workers, ASPEN INST. (Sept.
2018), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2018/09/Tax-Simplification-forIndependent-Workers_September-2018_Aspen-Institute-Future-of-Work-Initiative.pdf.
242 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TOPIC NO. 554, SELFEMPLOYMENT TAX (2019), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc554.html.
243 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1447-48 (discussing IRS data showing that average
profit ratios for small sole proprietors are approximately 40 percent and proposing
withholding calculated on that basis).

2019]

The Modern Case for Withholding

133

taxpayers, are also roughly 15 percent, making the combined tax rate
(income tax plus self-employment tax) equal to 30 percent in this
example. Combining these three factors, a default fixed withholding
rate might be set at 12 percent (40 percent times 30 percent).
For example, if a sole proprietor were paid $1,000, the default
withholding regime would assume that $400 of the payment
represented taxable income, and $600 represented deductible expenses.
If $400 were taxable at an income rate of 15 percent, plus an additional
15 percent of self-employment tax, the sole proprietor would owe $120
of tax. Withholding 12 percent of her gross payment of $1,000 would
collect the correct amount.
Even if a default withholding rate is set relatively low, some taxpayers
will be overwithheld. For example, a taxpayer may have no net taxable
income because his expenses exceeded his gross receipts, or because his
net income did not exceed the standard deduction. Some taxpayers may
prefer overwithholding as it will provide a tax refund. For other
taxpayers, overwithholding may create liquidity problems. A taxpayer
who is living paycheck to paycheck may not be able to afford her bills
if she is making extraneous tax payments.
Allowing taxpayers to opt to lower their withholding, or to opt out of
withholding altogether, would address these liquidity concerns.244
Taxpayers who expect to net little or no income could simply elect,
when they filled out their initial tax forms with the payer, to reduce
their withholding by checking a box on the form.
One potential risk with letting taxpayers opt out of withholding is
that they may choose to do so to evade their tax obligations. However,
this risk should be somewhat mitigated by the fact that such taxpayers
will still be subject to information reporting. Taxpayers may be less
inclined to intentionally underreport if they know that their income will
be reported to the IRS in any event.
However, even if taxpayers do not opt out of withholding with the
intention to commit evasion, there is still a risk that taxpayers will opt
out, fail to budget property, and be unable to make timely tax payments.
If policymakers view this is a significant risk, they could simply set a
floor on withholding. The floor would be lower than the default rate,
244 Reducing withholding would help taxpayers on a prospective basis. However,
taxpayers who didn’t realize they would experience liquidity problems from
withholding would not be able to claim a refund of overwithheld taxes until the
following year when they filed their tax returns. This is a feature of wage withholding,
as well. For example, an employee who loses her job mid-year cannot reclaim
overwithheld taxes until she files her tax return the following year. See Thomas, supra
note 5, at 1446.
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but would require some minimum level of withholding. For example,
the floor might assume a zero percent income tax rate but apply selfemployment taxes. If net profits were assumed to be roughly 40 percent
of gross payments, withholding for self-employment tax only would
equate to a withholding rate of 6 percent (15 percent times 40 percent).
On the flip side, some taxpayers may prefer higher withholding than
the default. For example, taxpayers for whom default withholding does
not satisfy their entire year’s tax liability may prefer more withholding
so as not to owe a balance. These taxpayers should be allowed to opt for
one of a range of withholding rates that are higher than the default.
Undoubtedly, some taxpayers will not know how their tax obligations
relate to default withholding rates, and a period of trial and error may
be necessary where they adjust their withholding rate after filing an
income tax return that either resulted in too large of a refund or an
undesired balance from the taxpayer’s perspective.
Having the option to tailor withholding to the taxpayer’s personal
situation is not unlike the current system for wage withholding, which
allows taxpayers to claim zero or a higher number of “allowances” that
reduce tax withholding. For example, an employee who desires to be
overwithheld may intentionally choose zero allowances even though
she is entitled to claim several.245 The proposal here is even simpler:
taxpayers could do nothing and be withheld at a default rate or could
choose a lower rate or a higher rate. Choosing a rate of withholding is
not an exact science, but it is undoubtedly easier than the allowance
system. Most taxpayers likely have no understanding of what the actual
financial implications are — in dollars — of claiming an additional
allowance on a Form W-4 (for employees). On the other hand, the
average taxpayer does understand the difference between withholding
10 percent of her earnings versus 15 percent of her earnings. What’s
more, independent contractors or other taxpayers who have experience
paying estimated taxes may already have a rough idea of what
percentage of their gross income they typically owe in federal taxes. For
this group, choosing a withholding rate is ideal and can probably be
done with relative accuracy. On the other hand, this group would
probably have a much harder time converting this percentage estimate
into an appropriate amount under an allowance system.

245

See supra note 32, at 1-2 and accompanying text.
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Withholding on Specific Sources of Income

a.

Independent Contractor Income
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As discussed in Part I, employees are subject to withholding for
payroll and income taxes, but the Code currently does not provide for
withholding for workers who are independent contractors. Yet, in some
cases, withholding would benefit workers, impose only small costs on
the payers, and would assist the government in collecting taxes.
Many (though not all) independent contractors work in settings in
which withholding is ideal, particularly gig economy workers. The
online platform companies (e.g., Uber or TaskRabbit) are large and
sophisticated, and already have the payroll infrastructure in place for
withholding because they also have their own fulltime employees. On
the other side of the transactions are numerous gig economy workers,
many who earn relatively low amounts of income and have little
experience with paying estimated taxes.246 This presents a setting where
the cost of imposing withholding are likely to be far lower than the
combined tax compliance burden currently imposed on a high number
of workers. The government is more likely to collect tax revenue in the
withholding scenario, as well.
Independent contractor withholding would not have to be limited to
the gig economy, however. Withholding requirements could be
extended to any business that uses independent contractors using the
parameters described above for determining which payers should be
required to withhold. Expanding withholding to independent
contractors would also address one of Doernberg’s principal objections
to withholding: that the law’s reliance on the employee/independent
contractor distinction is costly and encourages avoidance.247 If large
payers were required to withhold in either scenario, the incentive to
misclassify workers would be lower.248

246

See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1429.
See Doernberg, supra note 8, at 610-13 and accompanying text.
248 Although this addresses Doernberg’s concerns related to withholding, the
incentive to misclassify employees remains for other reasons, including avoiding payroll
tax obligations and various non-tax costs. See, e.g., Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A
Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The ‘Independent
Worker’ 7 (Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2015-10, 2015), http://www.
hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_
work_krueger_harris.pdf.
247
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Investment Income

Another source of income for which there is generally no withholding
is investment income, such as that received in the form of interest,
dividends, rents, royalties, and partnership interests. On the one hand,
compliance for many forms of investment income is already
exceptionally high. Income like dividends and interest, which is subject
to substantial information reporting, has a compliance rate of 93
percent.249 There is certainly an argument that withholding on such
income simply is not necessary. But when compliance rates are less than
perfect, the revenue at stake is not necessarily meaningless.
As an example, consider dividends and interest, both of which are
subject to substantial information reporting but not withholding. For
2016, IRS data reveals that taxpayers reported approximately $92 billion
of taxable interest income and $250 billion of dividend income on their
tax returns, for a combined amount of $342 billion.250 Since IRS
compliance data shows that interest and dividend income are
voluntarily reported at a rate of 93 percent, presumably the actual
amount of interest and dividend income earned is closer to $368
billion.251 In other words, the unreported 7 percent of interest and
dividend income should amount to approximately $26 billion.252 If the
average tax rate applied to dividend and interest income were 15
percent (a conservative estimate), the tax at stake for the unreported 7
percent would be about $4 billion.253 In reality, the effective tax rate is
likely even higher because preferential tax rates generally do not apply
to interest income or non-qualified dividends, and high-income
taxpayers pay a 20 percent tax rate on qualified dividends.254 A 20
percent tax rate would make the tax at stake over $5 billion.255
Several billions of dollars in additional tax revenue each year is not
trivial. Rather than assuming that 93 percent compliance is good
249

See I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES, supra note 41, at 5.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 4801, INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX RETURNS LINE ITEM ESTIMATES, 2016 36 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/16inlinecount.pdf (amounts are rounded).
251 93 percent x $367.7 billion = $342 billion.
252 7 percent x $368 billion = $25.8 billion.
253 15 percent x $26 billion = $3.9 billion.
254 Rates on qualified dividends are based on capital gains rates. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 1(h)(11)(B)(i) (2019); 2018 Capital Gains Rates, BRADFORD TAX INST. (2019),
https://bradfordtaxinstitute.com/Free_Resources/2018-Capital-Gains-Rates.aspx (last
visited Oct. 5, 2019) ($425,800 threshold for 2018 for top capital gains rate applicable
to single taxpayers).
255 20 percent x $26 billion = $5.2 billion.
250
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enough, policymakers should consider whether the cost of
implementing withholding is justified by the benefits, considering the
revenue at stake. In many cases, dividends, interest income, and other
investment income are paid out by large financial institutions or other
payers of significant size. Since these payers are already collecting and
reporting tax information for their investors, the marginal costs of tax
withholding may be relatively low. Investors could elect a flat
withholding rate at the time they provide tax information for their Form
W-9 (required for Form 1099 reporting). On the other hand, the
marginal cost to investors themselves of making tax payments on
investment income is uncertain. To the extent that investors merely
receive a reduced tax refund or make a small tax payment with their tax
return, the cost of direct remittance may also be low. On the other hand,
if a significant portion of investors must make quarterly tax remittances,
the cost will be higher. The outcome of this cost benefit analysis is
uncertain without further data, but the inquiry itself should be
undertaken.256
5.

Offer Inducements for Payers

Even if third-party remittance is more cost-effective than direct
remittance, payers will likely balk at having to incur additional costs to
withhold taxes. While in many circumstances, withholding reduces the
overall social costs of taxation, it still shifts costs away from both payees
and the government and onto third parties. To mitigate the resistance
to withholding, and to compensate payers for this cost, the government
could offer financial incentives tied to withholding.
a.

Payroll Services and Software

First, the government could offer free or subsidized online payroll
services (or payroll software) to help smaller payers manage
withholding obligations at minimal cost. In an analogous context, lowincome taxpayers are offered free online tax preparation services under

256 The Taxpayer Advocate recently issued a report on a Pay-As-You-Earn system that
analyzed the benefits of withholding on interest, pensions, dividends, capital gains
(reported on Form 1099-B), IRA distributions, and unemployment income. TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE SERV., A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF PAY-AS-YOU-EARN (PAYE) WITHHOLDING
SYSTEMS AS A MECHANISM FOR SIMPLIFYING AND IMPROVING U.S. TAX ADMINISTRATION 4
(2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018-ARC/ARC18_
Volume2_01_PAYE.pdf. The report found that expanding withholding to include those
income sources in addition to wages would cover tax payment obligations for 62 percent
of tax returns. See id. at 26-27.
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the IRS’s Free File Alliance Program.257 Under the Free File program, a
number of tax software companies (e.g., TurboTax, H&R Block) offer
limited versions of their tax preparation services free of charge,
accessible through the IRS website. Similarly, the government could
partner with online payroll companies such as Gusto, OnPay, or Patriot
Software to provide free payroll software to assist with withholding
obligations.258
Alternatively, the government could offer payers a tax credit to cover
their use of payroll software to deal with withholding obligations. For
example, a small business owner working with 10 employees would
incur annual costs of roughly $960 to deal with federal and state tax
obligations for those employees.259 A family with one household
employee (e.g., a nanny) would incur annual fees of roughly $500.260 A
tax credit would compensate taxpayers dollar-for-dollar for all or some
portion of those costs. For example, a business owner claiming a $100
tax credit for payroll services would reduce his tax bill by $100.
Short of offering a credit, the government could at least make payroll
costs deductible, above the line,261 for all payers. While those who incur
payroll costs in the course of their trade or business should be able to
deduct them as a business expense, individuals who withhold for
personal purposes (e.g., a family that employs a nanny) cannot deduct
these expenses under current law. Allowing a deduction for the cost of
payroll software or services would induce individuals to comply with
their withholding obligations and reduce the cost.

257 See Free File: Do Your Federal Taxes for Free, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/filing/free-file-do-your-federal-taxes-for-free (last visited July 11,
2019) (offering free file software for those with incomes below $66,000 for 2018). For
further description (and critique) of the program, see Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney
Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 151, 165-66 (2017).
258 See sources cited supra note 71. Like the Free File program, the benefits could be
limited to taxpayers with incomes below a certain threshold. See supra note 257 and
accompanying text.
259 Average estimated monthly cost of $80 was calculated using the pricing
structures of three major online payroll software companies (Gusto, OnPay, and Patriot
Software). See sources cited supra note 71.
260 Estimated annual costs were calculated using the pricing structures of three
major online payroll software companies (Gusto, OnPay, and Patriot Software). See
sources cited supra note 71.
261 “Above the line” deductions are subtracted from gross income in computing
adjusted gross income and are generally allowed in full. See 26 U.S.C. § 62 (2019).
“Below the line” deductions are generally subject to restrictions, for example, most
cannot be claimed unless taxpayers itemize their deductions rather than claiming the
standard deduction. See 26 U.S.C. § 63(a)-(b) (2019).
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For example, consider a married couple with a 25 percent tax rate
who spends $200 per year on payroll software to deal with tax
withholding obligations for their childcare provider. A $200 deduction
for this software cost would offer the couple a benefit worth $50.262
b.

Payer Credits

Instead of directly subsidizing the compliance costs related to
withholding, such as providing free payroll services, the government
could offer payers a credit for a portion of the tax withheld.263 For
payers making nondeductible payments (e.g., an individual who pays a
nanny), this credit would be the first and only tax benefit they receive
for withholding. For those making deductible business payments (e.g.,
compensation paid to an independent contractor working for a
business), the credit would be provided in addition to the business
deduction under section 162.264 The business deduction is allowable for
any business payment made to an independent contractor regardless of
whether withholding is present. But the credit would only be provided
when taxes are withheld. The credit could be a small percentage of the
tax withheld (e.g., 5 or 10 percent), or it could be a flat dollar amount
(e.g., $1,000). The purpose of the credit would be both to induce
withholding and to compensate payers for the compliance costs.
As a simple example, consider a corporation that pays an independent
contractor $10,000 per year. Further assume the contractor’s tax
liability on that income is $1,000. In the absence of withholding, there
are a number of reasons that the contractor might not report and pay
the full $1,000. She might purposefully evade the obligation (especially
if she is not issued a Form 1099), she might inflate her deductions to
avoid owing the tax (even if she does receive a Form 1099),265 or she
might simply fail to budget properly and lack the funds to make the
payment. In many common scenarios, the government will fail to collect
$1,000. It may collect a smaller amount, $500 for example, or it may
collect zero. On the other hand, if the government requires the

262

$200 deduction x 25 percent tax rate = $50.
Analogously, many states offer discounts to retailers on sales tax due, if those
taxes are paid on time. Such “vendor discounts” range from 0.5 percent to 5 percent.
See Scott Peterson, Which States Offer the Best Incentives for Filing Sales Tax on Time?,
AVALARA (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.avalara.com/us/en/blog/2016/12/states-offerbest-incentives-filing-sales-tax-time.html; see also Slemrod, supra note 20, at 264.
264 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
265 See Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve SmallBusiness Tax Compliance?, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 18-19 (2017).
263
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corporation to withhold a sufficient amount, it is highly likely that the
government will collect all $1,000 of tax owed.
This suggests that, at least for payees who are likely to underpay in
the absence of withholding, the government could cede some of the
revenue collected to payers and still come out ahead. Consider a payer
credit equal to 10 percent of the tax withheld, for example. In the case
of the contractor who has $1,000 of tax withheld, the payer receives a
$100 credit from the government. Thus, $900 in tax revenue goes to the
government and $100 goes to the payer, while the contractor has paid
the same amount of tax as without a credit. The payer is now
compensated for its collection costs, yet the government has still come
out ahead having collected $900 as compared to when there was no
withholding at all. Of course, this stylized example does not accurately
describe the cost-benefit analysis for withholding in all circumstances.
However, it is intended to illustrate the fact that compensating payers
may be a “win-win” scenario if, on balance, the additional tax collected
from withholding outweighs the cost of such compensation.266
c.

Scope of Subsidies

Should all payers receive subsidies for withholding costs? On the one
hand, offering subsidies to anyone who withholds, including
employers, would be expensive. Consider the amount of revenue at
stake, for example, if the government offered withholding credits to
large employers like Walmart. It may also be inefficient to offer
subsidies to employers who are already withholding and presumably
have already incurred the start-up costs of doing so.
On the other hand, limiting subsidies to non-employers makes
independent contractor characterization more attractive and may
encourage people to misclassify their employees. However, it is doubtful
that withholding subsidies would have much impact, as the incentives
to classify workers as independent contractors are already so great even
without additional subsidies.267 However, even if limiting subsidies will
not distort behavior, the public may perceive a fairness issue if the
government offers subsidies to one group of businesses (those that hire
independent contractors) but not another (those that hire employees).

266 The payer’s compliance costs would also have to be factored into the cost-benefit
analysis, as would the reduced compliance costs of the payee.
267 Among other benefits, hiring independent contractors allows payers to avoid
payroll tax obligations, labor and employment laws, and providing certain benefits like
healthcare. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 248, at 7.
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One way to address this problem would be to offer withholding
subsidies to all types of payers, regardless of whether the payers hire
employees or independent contractors, but only to those payers below
a certain earnings threshold. For example, any business earning less
than $500,000 of receipts could be entitled to free payroll software that
would handle withholding obligations, and all larger businesses would
be excluded. This would mitigate potential revenue loss while
minimizing any distortions or fairness concerns.
C. Quasi-Withholding
With the rise of technology, the private market has made it
increasingly easy and inexpensive for payers to deal with tax
withholding obligations. Businesses that use payroll software to
compensate employees can often add on tax withholding and
information reporting at minor additional cost.268 Yet, for workers who
must remit their own taxes, it does not appear the private market has
successfully offered the same level of ease. Many independent
contractors have a hard time estimating their taxes, in part, because
their income stream is unpredictable. This lack of predictability makes
withholding harder to implement; yet individuals with unpredictable
tax liability are the ones most likely to prefer overpayment and may find
paying taxes to be particular painful.269
In cases when withholding is not feasible — because it is too costly,
too difficult to calculate, or simply politically infeasible — policymakers
could instead focus on ways to emulate the benefits of withholding.
Recall that taxpayers generally like withholding because taxes are
subtracted before the person gets paid, it breaks tax liability into many
small payments, and it often results in overpayments; all of these things
reduce the pain of paying and appear to enhance utility. Withholding
also helps taxpayers overcome liquidity issues (from failing to
adequately save for taxes) and ensures the government collects tax in a
timely manner. In the absence of true third-party withholding by the
payer, taxpayers and the government might benefit from an approach
that tries to mimic withholding, what this Article refers to as “quasiwithholding.”
Quasi-withholding would introduce a third party between the payer
and payee to facilitate tax payments. The third party could be the
taxpayer’s bank or a private entity designed to assist with making tax
payments. The purpose of the third-party services would be to invoke
268
269

See sources cited, supra note 68.
See Schulz et al., supra note 164, at 248.
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the benefits of withholding without imposing the obligation directly on
the payer.
What would quasi-withholding look like? Consider the example of a
taxpayer that drives for Uber whose bank facilitates quasiwithholding.270 The taxpayer might open up a separate checking
account at her bank into which she would direct deposit payments from
Uber. The taxpayer could agree with her bank that a set percentage of
every deposit she makes into her business account would be
automatically deducted by the bank and set aside for taxes. The
percentage could be based on a suggested schedule tied to her estimated
earnings, but the taxpayer would have the option to adjust the
percentage. The bank could automatically withdraw the tax payment
every time she made a deposit. On a quarterly (or more frequent) basis,
the bank could also make a tax payment to the IRS on the taxpayer’s
behalf.
The taxpayer would not have to expend time or effort to make tax
payments nor would she have to budget for taxes. Further, when she
checked her account balance or withdrew money from her business
account, she would know the funds represent her net after-tax earnings.
This might mitigate or eliminate the endowment effect and make the
experience of paying taxes less painful overall. If she were otherwise
inclined to overspend her funds or make late tax payments, this too
would be mitigated. She could also deliberately err on the side of
overpayment so that she could claim a refund, if she so wished.
While the private market would be in the best position to facilitate
quasi-withholding, the government could promote its use in many of
the same ways it could incentivize withholding (discussed above). The
government could partner directly with third parties who could assist
with quasi-withholding, or it could subsidize the use of third-party
services through credits or deductions. Additionally, the IRS could
promote the use of quasi-withholding through its website and other
forms of taxpayer outreach.
Why hasn’t the private market already solved the problem of tax
complexity on its own?271 One answer may be that the solutions offered
by the market are too costly without government intervention.
Researching and signing up for an online service imposes decision costs
on taxpayers that they may wish to avoid, in addition to the fees charged

270 While banks would have easy direct access to taxpayers’ funds, other third-party
businesses formed specifically for this purpose could also facilitate quasi-withholding.
271 A related question is, has the private market already solved the problem?
Empirical studies would suggest it has not. See Bruckner, supra note 101, at 17.

2019]

The Modern Case for Withholding

143

for the services.272 Yet the use of private parties to assist with tax
obligations creates positive externalities: the government benefits if
more tax is paid. If the government offers subsidies, this would allow
taxpayers to capture some of that benefit, which would make quasiwithholding more attractive. Put more simply, a taxpayer is more likely
to rely on quasi-withholding through a private business if the IRS
advertises it and promises a tax incentive in exchange.
The economic analysis for subsidizing quasi-withholding is the same
as that for withholding. Expending government funds (e.g., a credit to
cover costs of a third-party service) may result in more tax collected
overall, while simultaneously reducing the burden of compliance for
taxpayers. Thus, there is good reason for the government to take an
active role in promoting the use of quasi-withholding, rather than
hoping taxpayers will incur the costs on their own.
CONCLUSION
The current U.S. tax withholding regime has been in place since the
Second World War. For decades, we have retained a system that
requires virtually no effort of employees, but imposes burdensome
compliance costs on non-employees. For much of the twentieth
century, this system made sense because the costs of withholding were
simply too great in many circumstances. But the internet and other
advances in technology have changed the calculus. Using software and
online programs, many independent workers could now benefit from
withholding or quasi-withholding at low cost to payers.
Policymakers could take an important step towards modernizing the
tax system by doing away with the rule that tax withholding is not
required outside of the employment context. A rule that instead
conditions withholding on the economic profile of the payer would
ensure withholding was imposed in situations when it would be most
efficient, while vastly simplifying the tax system for many independent
workers. What’s more, behavioral science research demonstrates that
paying taxes through withholding would make navigating the tax
system less painful for many individuals. At the same time, expanding
272 It is possible that private parties would eventually offer quasi-withholding
services for free if they were linked to other services. For example, a bank might offer
quasi-withholding services to entice customers to open a checking and savings account
at the bank. Further, banks could earn income from the use of taxpayers’ funds between
the time they were collected through quasi-withholding and the time the estimated
payments were made to the IRS. The income earned on taxpayers’ funds might provide
enough compensation for the quasi-withholding services that financial institutions
would be willing to offer them without fees.
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withholding would result in more tax revenue collected for the
government. The potential benefits to both taxpayers and the
government make this a uniquely attractive tax reform option.

